

**LEPL - DAVID AGHMASHENEBELI
NATIONAL DEFENCE ACADEMY OF GEORGIA**



**EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
AND MODERN CONFLICTS**



**COLLECTION OF THE PAPERS OF THE STUDENTS' S
SCIENTIFIC-PRACTICAL CONFERENCE
GORI, 2022**

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AMERICA'S INFLUENCE AND ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

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Abstract

In the 1950s, European socialists fought for a stable, peaceful security system. Initially, the European Defence Community (EDC) was able to keep this disagreement under control. Despite the Cold War, socialists saw the EDC as a chance to forestall a German autonomous force. After the Cold War, the growth of Europe's security architecture was significantly reliant on connections between the OSCE and NATO. Numerous OSCE reports highlighted NATO's significant commitment to boosting European security on issues such as outlining threats to security and stability in the twenty-first century. Despite NATO's continued strengthening, its post-Cold War prospects remain uncertain. The biggest alliance must expand into the Black Sea region to address its problems in the Middle East and beyond.

Russia's hostility and military confrontation with Ukraine resulted in a significant influx of immigrants to Europe, as well as an energy crisis in the EU. At the same time, the admission of Russia and Turkey forced Armenia and Azerbaijan to compete in the disputed area of Nagorno-Karabakh. Temporarily occupied Abkhazia declared its independence then it was the Tskhinvali Region and the last one was the De-Facto Republic of Moldova. So the presence of several asymmetrical threats in the area, combined with these halted wars, complicates the situation on NATO's eastern front.

Keywords:

Europe, America, Truman Doctrine, Marshal Plan, Cold War, NATO, OSCE, Ukraine.

INTRODUCTION

The article briefs America's influence and role in EU Security. Political realism is a perspective of international politics that emphasizes its competitive and conflictual aspects. In this regard, the thinker Thomas Hobbes, who examines the similarities between man and state in his work "Leviathan," says: "The construction of a state, although it gives individuals a way out of their natural situation, generates a new political dilemma at the state level." In a nutshell, the natural state is shifted from the personal to the state level, and the problem of national and international security arises as a result of the international system's anarchy" (Akobia, 2006).

US support in Europe involves far more than just the amount of US forces stationed there. In terms of military, politics, and social conscience, Europe heavily relies on the US security guarantee. After 70 years, the American alliance has become more than simply a foreign policy for many European nations. It has become a philosophy and even a way of life.

President Harry Truman's combativeness was reflected in the "Truman Doctrine" of March 1947, which was the first step. Truman requested Congress to approve \$400 million in emergency assistance, arguing that Greece and Turkey risked falling victim to subversion without assistance from friendly nations. He defended it by saying, "I believe we must encourage free peoples to sort out their futures in their manner."¹ The key to averting the takeover of free nations was to combat the "misery and want" circumstances that fostered authoritarianism. This broad idea soon covered all of Western Europe. Asserting that American policy was not "against any country or philosophy but starvation, poverty, despair, and instability" Secretary George C. Marshall suggested the provision of significant economic assistance to the shattered European nations in June 1947.² Its goal ought to be the restoration of a robust global economy, which would make it possible for free institutions to flourish on a political and social level. Secretary of State left out to mention that, while the American plan would be welcoming to the Soviet Union and its satellites in Eastern Europe, it placed a strong emphasis on the free market as the best route to economic recovery and the greatest barrier against communism in Western Europe. The European Recovery Program, often known as the Marshall Plan, was approved by Congress in response to Marshall's proposal. The restoration of a democratic Western Europe was unusually swift and long-lasting, thanks to a \$13 billion investment in Europe over the following years.

The resolution introduced in the Senate in June 1948 by Michigan Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg advocated the "development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defence following the purposes, principles, and provisions of the [United Nations] Charter."³ According to President Truman, containment strategies were already being used in Latin America. "An armed assault by any State should be treated as an attack against all the American States and, accordingly, each of the said Contracting Parties agrees to help," said the Rio Pact, which was signed in September 1947. The North Atlantic Treaty once again used the concept of collective security. It established NATO and was signed in Washington D.C. with the Rio Pact and the NATO Alliance. The cornerstones of Western containment policy were agreements on collective defence and economic aid.

After 1945, the majority of Secretaries of State were selected because they had extensive expertise in international affairs and the organizational abilities regarded necessary for successful performance. Secretaries had to spend a lot of time on administration in addition to the substantial travel they had to coordinate with their foreign colleagues and chiefs of state. Due to the significant significance that is now placed on foreign relations, Secretaries acquired a reputation even though the demands of their jobs expanded enormously. During this time, the department included several groups active during the war that dealt with international economic issues in its ongoing bureaucracy. The Under Secretary which was appointed in August 1946 oversaw global economic activities in collaboration with the economic affairs assistant secretary and developed strong working relationships with the International Bank for IBRD, IMF, and the UN's FAO. A shift in foreign policy necessitated a corresponding adjustment in the Foreign Service. To "improve, enhance, and extend the Foreign Service... and to consolidate and amend the laws related to its administration,"⁴ Congress approved the foreign service Act. The Foreign Service Reserve was also established under the legislation for economists, lawyers, medics, and intelligence analysts in recognition of the rising value of specialized experience. Finally, the Foreign Service School changed its name to the Foreign Service Institute and provided advanced training for Department employees in areas that were crucial in the quickly changing global environment. The War Department's former home during the war, which had become available following the Pentagon's completion, was used by the Department of State when it relocated there in April 1947. Foggy Bottom, a neighborhood in northwest Washington, D.C., served as the new home of the Department of State.

This unhappy but reliable situation started to alter in the 1960s. As American participation in Vietnam in-

1 Truman Doctrine quote from the speech
(<https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory>)

2 Marshal Plan (<https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/truman>)

3 "Containment and Collective Defence" by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg
(<https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/truman>)

4 History of the state government (<https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history>)

creased and as a war between (US) President John F. Kennedy and Soviet premier minister Nikita Khrushchev in Cuba was nearly avoided, Cold War tensions resurfaced. Despite this unfortunate beginning, what had initially been a defence-based organization came to symbolize a new phenomenon by the decade's end: détente, a thawing of tensions between the Western and Eastern Blocs caused by a reluctant acceptance of the status quo. France declared its decision to leave NATO in March 1966 and asked that all allied headquarters be removed from French soil. In March 1967, a new shape headquarters was created in Casteau, Belgium, and in October of the same year, NATO's headquarters relocated to Brussels. It's significant that France remained a member of the Alliance and continually reaffirmed its commitment to supporting its allies in the event of hostilities. Flexibility has always been essential to NATO's success, and the French decision to leave the organization's integrated military command structure proved that, unlike the Warsaw Pact, NATO was able to accept a range of opinions from its members. A period of political liberalization in Czechoslovakia known as the Prague Spring was put to a stop in August 1968 by a Soviet-led invasion, which serves as a reminder of this. Along with a similar invasion of Hungary in 1956 and military repression in Berlin in 1953, Soviet actions proved the Brezhnev Doctrine, which held that if given the choice between maintaining short-term control over its client states in Eastern Europe and long-term political and economic reform, the Soviet Union would choose to maintain short-term control. Once a Soviet leader was ready to choose for long-term reform, this approach would come to an end. Détente took on various guises. The "Flexible Response" plan of US President John F. Kennedy intended to replace the Massive Retaliation's absolute binary of complete nuclear war or peace. Flexible Response, which was implemented after the Cuban Missile Crisis, strengthened NATO's conventional defensive posture by providing military options short of a complete nuclear exchange in the event of a confrontation. "The Future Tasks of the Alliance,"⁵ presented to the North Atlantic Council in December 1967 by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, suggested that NATO should include a political track fostering communication and détente between NATO and Warsaw Pact members during this period. NATO's mission has evolved to include helping to alter the status quo as well as maintaining it. In 1973 a conference was held on Security and Cooperation in Europe as a result of the Harmel Report, which helped establish the groundwork for its organization. The Conference sparked the negotiations for the Helsinki Final Act two years later. The Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union were among the signatories of the Act, requiring them to uphold all basic liberties enjoyed by their people, including the freedom of expression, conscience, and religion. Internally, Soviet leaders downplayed these Act provisions, placing more emphasis on the Western acknowledgment of the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe. The Soviets eventually realized that they had committed themselves to strong, possibly disruptive beliefs.

The United States and the Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987, which prohibited all nuclear weapons as well as intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles. Mikhail Gorbachev had become the Soviet Premier in 1985. This is today viewed as a sign that the Cold War was about to end. The transatlantic alliance welcomed a freshly democratic Spain in 1982. Most foreign observers concluded that Soviet Communism had fallen behind the West intellectually by the middle of the 1980s. In retrospect, the Soviet Union's seeming devotion to the Helsinki Final Act's human rights standards was helpful in the dismantling of the ideological underpinnings of Communist governments. By the late 1980s, the communist government of Poland found itself compelled to engage with Lech Wasa, the head of the once-repressed autonomous trade union "Solidarity." Soon after, such rights would come under pressure from other democratic campaigners in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Command economies of the Warsaw Pact were at this point in their collapse. Despite having a smaller economy than the United States and spending three times as much on defence, the Soviet Union did so. Intending to substantially modernize the communist system, Mikhail Gorbachev took office. The Brezhnev Doctrine was reversed when the East German dictatorship started to fall apart in 1989 because the Soviet Union chose not to interfere. This time, the Soviet Union opted for long-term change over a short-term control that was increasingly beyond their capacity, which started a chain of events that eventually resulted in the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.

The development of Europe's security architecture after the Cold War has depended heavily on relations between the OSCE and NATO. Since the start of the Helsinki process, NATO has made significant contributions to the discussion within the OSCE on developing the OSCE Security model. Numerous OSCE papers, such as the 2003 OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century, highlight NATO's significant contribution to strengthening security in Europe. After the 9/11 tragical attacks, relations have continued to improve as a result of the increased emphasis on agendas established by the NATO Member States at the NATO Istanbul Summit and by the OSCE Participating States at recent sessions of the OSCE Ministerial Council. The Communiqué of the Istanbul Summit declares that "NATO and the OSCE mainly share obligations and objectives, both geographically and operationally. NATO will continue to expand its cooperation with the OSCE in areas including crisis management, post-war recovery, and conflict prevention."⁶

⁵ Formation of NATO and OSCE, pg 8.

https://www.globe-project.eu/case-study-of-the-european-security-architecture-nato-and-osce_11317.pdf

⁶ partnerships between the organizations <https://www.osce.org/partnerships/111485>

Cooperation addresses problems like:
Fighting global dangers, terrorism and cyber threats
Border security and management
Disarmament
Light and compact weaponry
Measures that increase security and confidence
Regional problems
Exchange of knowledge on each Mediterranean Dimension

The Kosovo force led by NATO, providing a secure environment for the international community on the ground, and the OSCE Mission in Kosovo have established tight working relationships since the OSCE Mission's deployment in July 1999. To put the Dayton Peace Agreement into effect, the OSCE mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. OSCE has been crucial in averting crises from worsening and stabilizing the circumstances in Southern Serbia in 2000–2001 and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Russia's war on its neighbor has provided an important answer to a fundamental question that NATO states have been asking for years: Will older members like the US, France, and Germany defend less wealthy ex-communist allies if they are attacked? As Western powers scramble to counter the threat posed by Vladimir Putin.

The question of whether the alliance is doing enough to thwart Russian expansionism after years of underfunding and heedless warnings has been brought up, as well as if the move to bolster the previously underfunded Black Sea area should have happened far earlier. After Putin's invasion of Ukraine, NATO is fully focused on how to block Russia in Europe's southeast and stop one of the poorest regions from turning into the continent's weakest point of security. Europe and Asia are separated by the Black Sea, bordered by Georgia, Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Russia. It connects with the Mediterranean Sea via the Bosphorus Strait in Turkey and is a vital trading route for agricultural products from Ukraine and Russia. At the same time as it increased involvement in conflict zones like Libya and Syria, where it has a naval base, the Kremlin strengthened its military capabilities in the Black Marine by reorganizing its ground troops, bolstering its air defences, and upgrading its sea fleet. The permanent stationing of NATO forces on the territory of the former Soviet bloc, including Bulgaria and Romania, is prohibited under the Basic Act of the NATO-Russia Council, the cooperation agreement drafted by President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2002. In reality, NATO soldiers stationed in these nations would be intervening in part in reaction to Russian adversaries. Chechnya and Dagestan, which ten years ago had relatively moderate Muslim populations, are today rife with violent Wahhabist and Salafist ideas and are important hubs for the development of both domestic and foreign Islamist terrorists. The Russians don't appear to be able to control the challenges that they face on their territory, much less the ones posed by terrorists operating in that area and targeting foreign targets. These serious dangers to regional and global security must be contained and eliminated with international assistance from NATO and American soldiers stationed in the area. The Russians will see any NATO incursion into their "near abroad" as intrinsically dangerous. An alliance presence in the region helps Russia's security, either through the NATO-Russia Council or more directly through a special diplomatic mission. The nations of the Black Sea are starting to take part in a variety of cooperative security initiatives as part of regional development. Since Georgian and Azerbaijani forces joined the Turkish force in the Balkans and Armenian troops joined the Greek force in Kosovo, cooperation in peacekeeping has been more widespread.

While such a program also facilitates the alliance's engagement in the greater Middle East⁷ and beyond, it is necessary primarily to improve European security in the same way that addressing the security issues in the Balkan region improves European security. A comprehensive program that seriously addresses Black Sea security issues and incorporates the region into the NATO security framework is also necessary. To defend Turkey from a potential biological or chemical assault by Iraq, France, Germany, and Belgium foolishly refused NATO aid to that nation in February 2003. These nations have a clear stake in maintaining the perimeter security of the alliance. Such a program would eliminate the need for a significant American presence in Germany. The traditional NATO member nations in Western Europe would feel safer if NATO defended the Black Sea and, maybe, eventually encircled it. The relevance of the Black Sea area for Euro-Atlantic security was briefly mentioned in the closing statement of the NATO summit in Istanbul in June 2004. This did not demonstrate a forward-thinking attitude on the part of NATO officials, especially after the alliance welcomed two important nations in the area, Bulgaria and Romania. The United States has already started to closely interact with the nations bordering the Black Sea. The institutions of the EU and NATO would be prudent to do the same.

Russian President Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine has resulted in Europe's worst humanitarian crisis in

⁷ contribution of NATO and OSCE

<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/black-sea-security-the-nato-imperative>

decades. Neighboring countries and international organizations are banding together to condemn Russia's war and provide relief to the growing number of refugees as hundreds of thousands flee the escalating violence. Ten million people, or approximately a quarter of the population, have reportedly been displaced, and of that number, about four million have fled to nearby nations like Hungary, Moldova, and Poland. The greatest war-related mass exodus since the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, the United Nations is geared up for up to seven million internally displaced people and up to seven million refugees. At least 902 people have been killed and 1,459 have been injured as of March 20, while the true numbers are probably far higher. Numerous Russian strikes have struck densely populated regions, forcing residents to take shelter in subway stations and depriving hundreds of thousands of people of necessities like power and water. Experts are particularly concerned about Russia's growing dependence on rockets, artillery, cluster bombs, and other weapons that have the potential to destroy civilian areas, including the main cities of Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Mariupol. They predict that this escalation will cause more infrastructure damage and human fatalities. Experts claim that the fast response from Europe is the biggest demonstration of European mobilization in recent years. Poland has taken in more than 2.2 million migrants, or more than half of all incoming refugees, and is already home to an estimated 1.5 million Ukrainians (including naturalized citizens and temporary migrant labor). The nation has established temporary housing, hospitals, and welcome centers that provide food, information, and medical supplies as part of its preparations.⁸

The surviving refugees have escaped to countries like Belarus, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, and other regions of Europe. Approximately 271,000 additional refugees, or 7.5%, have traveled east to Russia. The Temporary Protection Directive, a never-before-used regulation that would permit persons leaving Ukraine to join EU members for up to three years without requesting asylum, was unanimously endorsed by authorities at the European Union (EU) level. Since 2017, citizens of Ukraine have been permitted to enter the EU without a visa, enabling them to request refuge in any member state. Separately, the US has said that its forces stationed in Poland will be allowed to assist with the evacuation of refugees. On February 25, eleven of the Security Council's fifteen members voted in favor of a resolution sponsored by the United States that harshly denounced the conflict and demanded that Russia pull its troops out of Ukraine right now. Russia's veto, however, prevented the resolution from becoming law. (China, India, as well as the United Arab Emirates) A week later, the UN General Assembly's full emergency session the first since 1997 voted 141-5 in support of a similar resolution condemning the conflict.

Numerous UN agencies are acting concurrently. A crisis coordinator for Ukraine was immediately appointed by Secretary-General Antonio Gutierrez, who also offered \$20 million in relief from the UN Central Emergency Response Fund. The UN organization for refugees is also aiming to generate \$1.7 billion for humanitarian aid.

President Vladimir Putin dispatched Russian "peacekeeping" forces to the separatist areas of Donetsk and Luhansk, recognizing the two Eastern states, which Russian-backed rebels seized and held in 2014 as republics independent of Kyiv after months of denials. Analysts were quick to point out that Putin's decision, despite the particulars of the Ukrainian conflict, matched a recent trend in Russian military operations, which attempt to subdue neighbors and block their aspirations to the west to impede NATO's eastward expansion. Long used as a tool by the Kremlin to expand its influence outside of Russian territory, so-called "frozen disputes."⁹ Transnistria, the separatist province of Moldova, has supported a pro-Russian government for the previous three decades. To back the separatist governments in the temporarily occupied Tskhinvali region and Abkhazia, two regions with sizable Russian-speaking populations, it launched an invasion of Georgia in 2008. Six years later, Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and started assisting a pro-Russian separatist rebellion in the Donbas. In each instance, Moscow acted out of concern that the region would leave its sphere of influence, and the existence of ethnic Russian communities gave the Kremlin a justification for doing so. The same reasoning was at work during Putin's meandering address, during which he asserted, without providing any supporting evidence, that Russian-speaking inhabitants of Ukraine were experiencing "genocide."

With their aspirations of one day joining the NATO military alliance and the certainty that Russia won't let them leave, Georgia and Ukraine are both at risk of falling into the same geopolitical "gray zone." Their different separatist states, solely recognized by Russia, are fully at the mercy of Moscow's decisions. "Those entities could not live on their own, but from the Russian perspective, their vulnerability is also a benefit since it binds them closer to Russia," said Fasola. Without Moscow's assistance, they couldn't live, which supports Russia's ongoing involvement there.

Critics point out that Putin's actions have exacerbated anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine and Georgia, raising questions about just how much control Russia can exercise. This is a show of support from a nation that has previously endured under occupation and is still suffering today." Although Russia may have met its immediate goals, Avdaliani claimed that it has "lost reputation and soft power." Ukraine would consider shifting their geopolitical

8 Aid for Refugees <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/ukraine-humanitarian-crisis-refugees-aid>

9 Black Sea region: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-08-19/ukraine-war-nato-races-to-counter-russia-threat-in-vulnerable-black-sea-region>

allegiance to Russia. Russia, in my opinion, has lost the advantages it had even after the fall of the Soviet Union in the long run. However, for Kremlin strategists, enmity against Moscow is a cost worth paying to stop NATO expansion in its tracks. It's clear that Russia's actions since 2014 have infuriated the Ukrainian people and strengthened Kyiv's anti-Russian stance. According to Fasola: "However, the same Ukrainian administration is fully aware that Russia has the power to decide or at the very least significantly influence its political decisions". Regardless of how anti-Russian they may be, they must consider Moscow's stance and behavior.

CONCLUSION

At this point, it is possible to infer that America's growing ambition in EU security and defence has been the primary cause of influence within the EU during the last seventy years, affecting both the EU's relationship with NATO and the OSCE. It remains to be seen whether the push provided by if maintained, the United States can be used to achieve greater coordination among the various interconnected actors, prevent any deterioration of the EU security architecture as a result of tensions, competition, or rivalry, and strengthen this architecture in the face of critical strategic quandaries and constant external security threats.

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SOCIAL COMMUNICATION DURING MODERN CONFLICT

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Abstract

Today's armed conflicts have different backgrounds. Some countries are fighting to gain independence, others for influence, and still others are experiencing civil wars. Among the most frequently cited causes of conflict, there are primarily cultural, ethnic and religious differences. Increasingly, they also include environmental threats. These can occur when, for example, one country uses a chemical agent that threatens the environment or the people of a neighboring country. The purpose of this article is both to present the relationship between social communication and modern conflict and to point out the dangers that can be caused by social communication conducted inadequately. The authors also wished to provide insight into the impact of the democratization of social communication on the conduct of modern conflict and the value of properly conducted social communication.

Keywords:

social communication, conflict, media, democratization

Introduction

Social communication is the domain of all human activities in which there is contact with at least two social units. It refers to the exchange of information between them at both the verbal (words) and non-verbal (gestures, symbols, body language, space, etc.) levels. The cultural content of a message is of particular importance in the process of social communication.¹

Communication, understood as a system of multiple relationships between political actors, organizations, media or people, today has a special ability to shape relationships with each other, promote established behavior and political, social and cultural patterns. An important role in these processes is played by the media, which, as a tool, has become not only the main source of images and descriptions of social reality, but also an effective tool for activating and promoting innovation. As a result, modern conflicts are among the phenomena characterized by a high degree of mediatization.

Media and Conflicts - A Case Study

The media has become a vehicle for the transmission of information, aimed at dynamically shaping, modifying or changing knowledge, attitudes and behavior in a direction that is consistent with the values and interests of the interacting actors. The main purpose of any message, verbal or non-verbal, is to try to convey information to the recipient, who ascribes specific meanings to the words and gestures coming from the sender.

In the communication process, conflict can be defined as a clash of differing views and interests. An example of using information to start a conflict is the 2003 attack on Iraq. At the time, the testimony of a witness, an Iraqi chemist, was used to describe mobile biological weapons factories placed on trucks.

Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi worked at the Jerf al-Nadaf Military Factory near Baghdad in the mid-1990s. He left Iraq for Germany, where he was granted political asylum because he allegedly agitated against Saddam's regime. In March 2000, he was contacted by the German secret service Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). An officer of that institution began to question Janabi about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and the man came up with a story about truckloads of biobombs that were supposedly kept at the Jerf al-Nadaf facility, among others. The interrogations continued for several months, with Janabi developing his story and providing more details. In November 2000, German and British agents met with Janabi's former boss. The latter vehemently denied reports of trucks with biological weapons in Jerf al-Nadaf. At the time, Janabi admitted that he had made the whole thing up.

For almost two years the case went quiet, until in May 2002 BND operatives returned to get more information about the weapons, despite denials. In return, they promised to help Janabi bring his Moroccan wife and child to Germany. The talks touched on various issues, but it wasn't until February 2003 that the agents returned to the most important topic. A month later, Powell² gave a famous speech in which he referred to descriptions of Janabi. According to the Iraqi's story, the Germans were so eager to find confirmation of the presence of weapons of mass destruction that they believed everything Janabi had previously said. He himself claims that the descriptions he gave them could have been invented by any chemical engineer. Janabi also alleges that the BND's intelligence service broke the terms of the agreement as it agreed not to pass on his confessions to other intelligence agencies. The Iraqi's confessions are further evidence of how fragile the decision to invade Iraq was made on.³

Democratization of Social Communication

Strategic communication is also used in the conduct of conflicts. It involves planned and thoughtful communication activities aimed at achieving the long-term interests of a specific entity. It allows you to reach specific target groups to promote your own conviction. Strategic communication within the defence framework is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence, having at its disposal the Operations Center of the Minister of Defence.⁴ The center manages the public communication process - external and internal to the ministry - except for reporting on the mood of the military community. It also manages matters in the field of defence-related social research. The center shapes the ministry's image and studies public sentiment in the context of the activities of the ministry.

Media and social communication sciences in the context of strategic communication emphasize the importance of the media in the communication process. With the progressive evolution of civilization and the spread of free access to information, the media have gained a monopoly on manipulating information and policy makers as well as entire societies. In the context of information warfare, the media has become an effective tool of the enemy in psychological operations. Through the media message, concrete, personified information reaches the enemy, ap-

1 M. Bodziany, *Intercultural Communication in Multinational Military Units*, Wrocław 2012, p. 127

2 65-th Secretary of State of the United States from 2001 to 2005

3 Saddam's Secret Weapon Made Up, <https://wyborcza.pl>, [accessed 26/10/2022].

4 See <https://www.gov.pl/> [accessed October 26, 2022].

peeling to emotions related to one's own safety and the health and life of one's family.

To understand the democratization of social communication, first it is necessary to know the definition of democratization. It is the process of transforming the political system to expand the political participation of citizens in the activities of a state, that is, the process of transition from a non-democratic to a democratic system. It takes place at 3 levels: institutional or formal, legal and social, and mentality. Juxtaposed with social communication, the democratization of social communication should be understood by involving a growing community of citizens in social media and online engagement.

The Value of Information

Having already understood the definition of democratization and social communication and realizing the impact that information can have, one can focus on the value that information has.

We have come to live in a time when we lie to ourselves, claiming that the world is ruled by money. A simple example can be given to confirm these words. Looking at a large corporation such as Coca - Cola, one can easily come to the conclusion that they trade in sums that the average person will not have a chance to experience in his entire life, but what would Coca - Cola be without its unique taste? The greatest value of this company is not the sphere of influence, revenue in general or recognition, because it is not difficult to imagine a situation in which this giant withdraws from a country reducing all the features mentioned earlier. The greatest value of this company is the formula, namely the information about the composition. At this point, only three people in the entire world possess it and there is a provision in the terms of their contract that obligatorily prohibits them from traveling on the same means of transportation, because if all three die at the same time, the company will lose its *raison d'être*. At this point, we begin to see the true value of information in itself, because receiving a large amount of cash at one time is less profitable than having the knowledge of how to make millions. Moving on to the substance, information is a powerful means used to achieve one's own goals, whether they are the interests of individuals or entire societies. Referring to the previously mentioned arguments and realizing the real values of social communication, democratization, information and interests, we can move on to the use of these in modern conflicts.

The Power of the Internet

More than half of the world's population⁵ is an Internet user, which provides the opportunity to reach an unimaginably large audience. It is not difficult to guess that this provides a huge number of opportunities, but also poses a large number of risks. Such a powerful tool in the wrong hands can spread evil of the best quality and best quantity.

Taking into account that only less than a quarter of⁶ people verify the information they read on the Internet gives us an idea of how big a problem we may be dealing with here. The Internet community, as an interest group of military circles, is a powerful tool that will exert a certain influence on the *de facto* target group through the mass media through properly given information and opinions.

Analyzing the example of hybrid warfare⁷ that has been going on for several years in Ukraine and Russia, we can see the use of all the previously mentioned instruments to achieve not only political, but also military goals. The growing number of informed Internet users translates not only public sentiment into shaping, but also has an impact on a very important military parameter, namely morale. The use of public opinion as a tool to influence large corporations that, for example, are withdrawing from the Russian Federation territory has become one of the most widely used means to make the average representative of that country aware that something is happening behind the propaganda curtain. At this point, even if the ordinary citizen is not given true information, he is able to see the hidden problem. To confirm these words, one can cite the case of the McDonald's chain,⁸ which, after an uninterrupted 30 years, withdrew from the market of Russia due to its military aggression against Ukraine. Ordinary residents, observing the changes that took place in the market, the emptiness of the stores and the little information that came from across the border, began to express their concerns through mass protests that ended in arrests and the suppression of riots.⁹ This is one of many examples of one side of the conflict exerting influence on the other through the mass media.

Any propaganda is able to be coped with when accusations come from the mouth of an individual, but when real information comes directly to citizens via instant messaging that cannot be controlled, people will begin to be aware of the realities they face. The Internet community as a collection of people from all over the world who have

5 According to the Infomax Group, there will be 4.95 billion Internet users in 2022, with a global population of 7.91 billion.

6 According to Forsal.pl, only 23% of Internet users verify the veracity of information they read on the Internet.

7 J. Hajduk, T. Stępniewski, *Russia's Hybrid War against Ukraine: Conditions and Instruments*, 2015

8 According to Money.co.uk, *McDonald Is Leaving the Russian Market after 30 Years*.

9 Ukraine war: Protests in Russia's Dagestan Region against New Draft <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63028586> [accessed October 27, 2022].

their own ideas have invented a new way to fight the idealized information published by the propaganda of the Russian Federation. Despite the fact that they can't fight on the front lines they began to participate in the information war by creating numerous memes, ridiculing images while belittling the power of the aggressor. In this way they have found a very simple, yet effective and accessible tool to almost everyone to raise awareness of the conflict and current events even to people who do not follow news portals. On the other hand, however, we can see a different use of social media as a means of relief.

When considering the situation of Ukraine and the generally understood sympathy towards their citizens by the international community, one can observe solidarity with the people of this country. People from all over the world united in their actions through various portals show support and send material aid to those in need, affected by the conflict. Following this example with the help of mass media, certain groups have been forced or voluntarily taken action to start or end the actions taken. One of these groups is Anonymous¹⁰ which is a group of activists who are taking an active part in the ongoing hybrid warfare. Acting in line with prevailing public opinion about Russia's aggression against Ukraine, they have undertaken a series of attacks on civilian and military information infrastructures revealing the truth and obstructing the Federation's troops.

Conclusion

Summarizing all the information previously given, we can easily come to the conclusion of how important social communication is as a tool for increasing awareness of people using the Internet. Knowing the true value of information and how to use it, we come to the conclusion that it is an important instrument especially during modern conflicts. Given that it is only a means to achieve the goals of individuals or groups, we must realize that despite growing awareness it can still pose a threat even to the modern-day giants of the international arena. The Internet community seems to be confirming this rule and taking the first steps towards globalization in the broadest sense in order to create transnational structures and create a world village. Having in mind that the technological boom has really only just begun, more than 60% of the population is going beyond its reach and is able to contact without any problems across all borders with other people even on the other side of the world. Let's hope, as it dies last, that such a powerful weapon will spread goodness, because it is solely up to us how we use it.

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VIRTUAL BATTLEFIELD IN CURRENT CONFLICTS: RUSSIA-UKRAINE CYBER WARFARE

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Abstract

The 21st century is the technological era. The past has taught humanity the value of technological advancement. The role of modern inventions must be distinctly underlined in warfare all around the world.

The current war between Russia and Ukraine is a curious case for observers because of two active battlefields, including physical and virtual. The pre-cyber-attack history of these two countries is also something considerable. Cracks in the cyber security system of Ukraine appeared in early 2014.

In the years afterward, there were several stealthy and relatively light invasions of Ukraine's cyber structure in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2021 before the massive 2022 operations. The actions from both sides are even more intriguing because both countries are in the same region, and one of them, Russia, more precisely, is famous for aggression in every field, and cyber security is no exception. Thus, the meaning of these cyber operations is much more profound than it seems.

The price of gained information or a damaged system is dramatic. Since the current war and its consequences are not alienated from the entire world, the widely well-known hacker group Anonymous and other hacktivists are officially supporting Ukraine. Their participation was conceptually vital at a time when it was most needed.

Furthermore, since the war is not over, we might see more contradictory cybercrimes and the audacity of Russia in the cyber field. Cheating on imposed regulations may pester sides and give momentum to new misunderstandings.

Keywords:

cyber-security, Russia, Ukraine, invasion, hack, hacktivists, technologies, warfare.

Introduction

Prehistory of Russia Ukraine's cyber warfare

The claws of Russian hackers were existing in Ukraine's cybersecurity system for a long time before. The first official Russian attack on Ukrainian cybersecurity was carried out in March 2014. Russian hackers aimed to destabilize the computers of Ukrainians. This must have caused computer network and communication problems. The concept of their invasion was to divert the attention of Ukrainians with this attack from the ongoing operations, or annexation, precisely, in Crimea. Sooner in the same year, we had another attack, when Russian hacktivists crossed the borders and attacked the Ukrainian central election commission. This is the year, when Ukraine was about to choose a president independently, and Russia's main goal in this event was to falsify the results of the elections and declare its preferred candidate the winner. The Russians were short on time and botched this operation. The only result of the process was to delay the counting of votes longer than expected before the attack, and this manipulative attack did not have significant, damaging results. According to Joseph Kiniry, a cyber-security expert for Internet voting systems, "This is the first time we've seen a cyber-hacktivist organization act in a malicious way on such a grand scale to try to wreck a national election." "To hack in and delete everything on those servers is just pillaging, wanton destruction." Fortunately, Ukrainians managed to remove this malicious program on time and gained take control over the current process.¹ (Coynash 2014)

Later in December 2015, a group of Russian state-sponsored hackers named "Sandworm" launched an attack on the power grid. They managed to hack three electricity companies as well as damage their systems. The malware, which they launched, was supposed to cause an outage for more than 230,000 Ukrainian residents at the source of electricity. Following the investigation, it was discovered, that this malware was very similar to what Russian hackers later used in Kyiv for the same purposes. As the deputy chairman of the State Service of Special Communications, Viktor Zhora, said after the invasion, the team of Ukraine's cyber defence had an immediate response to the intrusion, and they managed to stave off feasible damage.

In 2016, Ukraine faced a new wave of attacks from a well-known enemy. It was another power grid intrusion, which was slightly different from the previous one. This time the period of attack was relatively short: it lasted only one hour. The target was Kyiv. The fact that this operation was so well prepared and planned stands out. They were indeed very skilled hackers. This did not destroy anything significant, but it did expose flaws in the Ukrainian cyber system. Even though it was kind of the same type of malware, they [Russian hackers] managed to sneak into Ukrainian networks for the second time. For extra damage, they also destroyed operator workstations by crowding nets, making it almost impossible for companies to easily restore power to customers. In the majority of the 80 000 cases, the light was restored within three hours. (Zetter 2016)²

This is the period when the group of Russian hackers behind the attacks were revealed. Investigations have shown, that they also contributed to the January 2016 attacks, although their most aggressive appearance was in 2017, when self-propagating "NotPetya" was distributed on the Ukrainian network. With this program, they attacked the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and also important government entities, including financial services, various institutions, the postal service, newspapers, transportation lines, and many businesses. WPP, the world's largest advertising agency, said it was among several companies hit by the attack. APM Terminals, a subsidiary of Dutch shipping giant Maersk, announced that 17 of its global shipping container terminals had been hacked. A.P. Moller Maersk has implemented additional security measures in response to this new sort of malware, and it is continually reviewing its systems warding off attacks. (Perlroth 2017)³

From the beginning of 2021, intensive cyberattacks targeted Ukraine's cyber-security and defence systems. They were launching malware in a nonstop regime, and soon after massive cyber invasions, physical conflict started too. However, in 2018, there was one more notable attempt: The Russians' target object this time was the Auly chlorine distillation station, but their attempt had still no result. Fortunately, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) had a quick enough response to the act, and they managed to thwart this attack. It would be dramatically disadvantageous for Ukraine because the Auly station supplies 23 Ukrainian provinces as well as Moldova and Belarus. (Pike 2019)⁴

It is obvious that the targets of these hackers were and still are mostly politically and strategically important objects. They were not focused on personal benefits or the facilities providing these important benefits, including

1 Coynash, Halya. 2014. iwpr.net. May 27. Accessed May 27, 2014. <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/russian-fake-shows-ukraine-election-body-claiming-far-right-win>.

2 Zetter, Kim. 2016. wired.com. march 3. Accessed march 3, 2016. <https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/>.

3 Perlroth, Nicole. 2017. nytimes.com. june 27. Accessed june 27, 2017. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/technology/ransomware-hackers.html>.

4 Pike, John. 2019. globalsecurity.org. august 19. Accessed august 19, 2019. <https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/ukraine/sbu.htm>.

banks and other institutions. The only time money (or rather, cryptocurrency) appeared in their set in 2017. In their viral code that appeared on users' screens as a condition of the malware "Notpetya," the text told Ukrainian users that if they wanted to regain access to their computers, they would have to pay a certain amount in cryptocurrency to a specific account. However, they were unable to restore access even after a certain number of users paid this amount. The virus was so damaging and effective that both the investigation and the elimination turned out to be laborious and time-consuming processes. (Bing 2022)⁵

Ongoing war

The current Russia-Ukraine war has proven to us that the virtual battlefield also plays a big role of the biggest armed conflict of the 21st century. Cyber security was one of the first institutions that the Russians managed to attack before going to war. On January 3, 2022, Microsoft detected unusual activity from two Microsoft Exchange servers: large amounts of data were being sent to IP addresses. An investigation revealed that the attackers, later identified as Russian hackers, used a Microsoft vulnerability to steal the entire contents of several user mailboxes around the world, including in Ukraine, the United States, and Australia. This was the first in a series of cyber-attacks on Ukraine, which included taking down government websites and sending out threatening messages, instructing Ukrainians to withdraw cash from ATMs, DDoS attacks on banks, bomb threats to schools, and even a malware wiper that erased all data in a network. The timeline of 2022 attacks seems to be endless at first glance, but all of them have specific damage on the countries. (E.Sanger 2022)⁶

January 2022: Hackers planted destructive malware (WhisperGate) disguised as ransomware on the systems of numerous Ukrainian government, nonprofit, and information technology organizations. Researchers believe this attack was carried out by hackers with ties to the Russian GRU.

January 2022: Hackers targeted approximately 70 Ukrainian government websites, bringing several down and defacing the Foreign Ministry website. The defacement included a threatening message to Ukrainians and a notice of personal data exposure, which Ukraine's Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security later refuted.

January 2022: A phishing attack was launched against a Western government agency operating in Ukraine. The actors submitted a malware-infected resume to a Ukrainian job posting platform and a government agency. The Ukrainian Security Service previously linked this attack to a hacking group linked to the Russian FSB.

February 2022: Through a phishing attack, hackers infected a Ukrainian energy company with espionage malware. The Ukrainian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-UA) blamed the attacks on a group that has been targeting Ukrainian government organizations since at least March 2021 and is suspected of having ties to the Russian GRU.

February 2022: Hackers used malware disguised as Ukrainian language translation software to send phishing emails on behalf of Ukrainian government agencies. The attack was carried out by a group with ties to the Russian GRU, according to researchers.

February 2022: DDoS attacks were launched against the Ukrainian banking sector and government websites, temporarily knocking them offline. The Russian GRU was blamed for the attacks on financial institutions in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia.

February 2022: According to the Times, Chinese hackers attempted to compromise data and disrupt services by targeting vulnerabilities in over 600 critical infrastructure institutions and the Defence Ministry in Kyiv. Their source claims to be a member of the Ukrainian Security Service, but the service denies this.

February 2022: DDoS attacks were launched against websites belonging to the Ukrainian banking sector and the Ukrainian government, rendering some sites inaccessible. This was the second DDoS attack in two weeks against Ukrainian banks and government websites.

February 2022: Hackers used a destructive malware (HermeticWiper) to wipe out around 300 systems in Ukraine's financial, government, energy, information technology, and agricultural organizations. This attack was linked to a Russian GRU-affiliated group, according to researchers.

5 Bing, James Pearson and Christopher. 2022. "reuters." reuters.com. May 10. Accessed May 10, 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/factbox-the-cyber-war-between-ukraine-russia-2022-05-10/>.

6 E.Sanger, David. 2022. nytimes.com. january 16. Accessed january 16, 2022. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/16/us/politics/microsoft-ukraine-cyberattack.html>.

February 2022: On the network of an agricultural company, hackers installed a file encryptor. Researchers determined that the attack was likely to target grain production in Ukraine and blamed it on a group with suspected ties to the Russian GRU.

February 2022: DDoS attacks were launched against the Kyiv Post, knocking the website offline. Until connectivity was restored, The Kyiv Post published news on social media platforms.

February 2022: On a Ukrainian government network, hackers installed destructive malware (IsaacWiper).

February 2022: With a phishing attack, hackers targeted European government members involved in coordinating logistics for refugees fleeing Ukraine. The actors used a compromised email address from a Ukrainian military member.

February 2022: Hackers used destructive malware to target satellite communications company Viasat, preventing modems from communicating with Viasat Inc's KA-SAT satellite. The attack disrupted connectivity throughout Ukraine and Europe, as the satellite serves customers in multiple countries. Russia was blamed for the attack by the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union.

February 2022: Researchers linked a hacking group to the Belarusian government, which used phishing to target high-profile Ukrainians. Hackers intended to gain access to the individuals' social media accounts and disseminate false information about Ukrainian forces.

February 2022: Hackers used destructive malware to target a Ukrainian border control station, forcing officials to manually process people fleeing into Romania.

March 2022: At least 30 Ukrainian university websites were targeted by hackers. Researchers believe the attack was carried out by a Brazilian-based group that openly supports Russia.

March 2022: On March 9 and February 24, hackers targeted telecom provider Triolan, disrupting network connectivity. According to a Triolan source, the hackers reset the company's computer settings to factory settings, and some equipment required physical access to restore, which was difficult given the ongoing crisis.

March 2022: A suspected Russian-linked hacker used destructive malware to target a major broadcasting company (DesertBlade).

March 2022: Hackers used malware to disrupt services provided by charities, nongovernmental organizations, and other aid organizations in Ukraine.

March 2022: Hackers used phishing to target Ukrainians in order to deploy malware that compromises user data. The email promised a government payment "in the amount of 15,000" as support during "this difficult time."

March 2022: A Ukrainian research institution was targeted by a suspected Russian-linked hacker. This institution has previously been featured in false Russian weapons conspiracies.

March 2022: A Russian nation-state actor is suspected of stealing data from a nuclear safety organization.

March 2022: According to the operator, hackers targeted the Vinasterisk network, affecting connectivity in western Ukraine.

March 2022: In Ukrainian organizations, hackers used a destructive malware called CaddyWiper. This attack was linked to a group affiliated with the Russian GRU, according to researchers.

March 2022: Hackers targeted Ukraine 24, a Kyiv-based media outlet, to report that President Zelensky had announced his surrender to Russia. President Zelensky later released a video in which he stated that the message was a hoax.

March 2022: A phishing attack was launched against the systems of Ukrainian state authorities. The attack was carried out by a group affiliated with the Luhansk People's Republic, according to CERT-UA (LPR).

March 2022: Hackers targeted several Ukrainian news outlets, defacing their platforms with symbols that are prohibited in the country. The Ukrainian Security Service stated that they had identified the attackers' networks and servers.

March 2022: Hackers used destructive malware (DoubleZero) to target Ukrainian businesses.

March 2022: Hackers attacked the Ukrainian Red Cross website, causing it to go down for several hours.

March 2022: Hackers used phishing to target Ukrainian organizations. The malware installs a backdoor that

grants hackers access to and control over system data. These attacks were attributed by CERT-UA to a group previously identified by the Ukrainian Security Service as having ties to the Russian FSB.

March 2022: According to researchers, Chinese hackers targeted Ukraine in a phishing attack. The email contains a malware-infected document that appears to be from the National Police of Ukraine.

March 2022: Hackers targeted a transport and logistics company in western Ukraine. This attack was linked to a suspected Russian GRU-affiliated group, according to researchers.

March 2022: Hackers used WordPress sites to launch DDoS attacks against ten websites, including Ukrainian government agencies, think tanks, and financial sites.

April 2022: In an attempt to gain access to Ukrainian government officials' Telegram accounts, hackers launched a phishing attack.

April 2022: A group targeted several Ukrainian media outlets in an attempt to gain long-term access to their networks and collect sensitive data. Microsoft took over seven internet domains used by the group to mitigate these attacks. The group is linked to the Russian GRU.

April 2022: Hackers targeted a Ukrainian energy facility, but efforts to shut down electrical substations in Ukraine were largely thwarted by CERT-UA and private sector assistance. Researchers believe the attack was carried out by the same group with suspected ties to the Russian GRU that used an updated version of the same malware to target Ukraine's power grid in 2016.

April 2022: Hackers launched a DDoS attack on Ukraine's national post office just days after the release of a new stamp honoring a Ukrainian border guard. The agency's ability to run its online store was harmed as a result of the attack.

April 2022: Hackers set up a bogus Ukraine 24 Facebook page, prompting users to enter personal and payment information.

April 2022: In a phishing attack, hackers used a compromised Ukrainian government email. This attack was linked by CERT-UA to hackers with suspected ties to the Russian GRU.

April 2022: A phishing attack was launched against Ukrainian government officials.

June 2022: A phishing attack was launched against Ukrainian government organizations.

June 2022: A phishing attack was launched against Ukrainian media organizations. The attack was attributed to a suspected Russian GRU-linked group by CERT-UA with a "average level of confidence."

All above mentioned dates of attacks are verified and reported by general support to CSIS (Center for strategic & international studies).

Center for strategic & international studies. "Cyber War and Ukraine." Accessed June 16, 2022 (Lewis 2022))⁷

Anti-Russian Group of hackers

Various hacker groups have an interesting and important role in conducting cyber warfare. Support groups for both sides have emerged around the world. Many of these groups' statements include threats against critical government infrastructure. Some collectives are state-sponsored, while others are decentralized — but they are all capable to bring down computer systems as well as breach organizations.

Without a doubt, every anti-Russian hacker's support was extremely important, but Anonymous was one of the most important one among them. They declared their position very boldly and engaged in a cyberwar against Russia. Crucial government websites had been shut down by them. Their contribution to the war was dramatically imperative and continues to be remarkable. Although a Russian propaganda television network called "RT" was also targeted and destroyed.

Ghostsec- they supported Ukraine too. They said: "we stand by you in support of the people of Ukraine!". Mentioned group is also called Ghost Security. (Brussels 2016)⁸

⁷ Lewis, James Andrew. 2022. CSIS. June 16. Accessed June 16, 2022. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/cyber-war-and-ukraine>.

⁸ Brussels, 14 March 2016. 2016. crisisgroup. March 14. Accessed March 14, 2016. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/cop-special-series>.

Belarusian Cyber Partisans – the actions of this group were very helpful and bold. As it is known, Russia sent a great number of soldiers to Ukraine through the Belarus. The group was able to help Ukraine by damaging Belarusian train system. They were able to stop trains. The group itself is known for well conducted partisan fights against Belarusian Pro-Russian government. (Smith 2022)⁹ (Gallagher 2022)¹⁰

Secjuice - Supports Ukraine. This group has been using open-source intelligence (OSINT) and psychological operations to take a less volatile approach (PsyOps). They are developing a website for missing persons in Ukraine and they turned out to be the only source of information for families at the request of the IT army. On March 2, the group requested assistance ensuring the fact that the website was hosted on a secure server and was not vulnerable to attacks.

Raidforums Admin - Supports Ukraine. The group stated clearly: "Raidforums2 is in support of Ukraine". Members actively attack both Russian infrastructure and DDOS Russian websites. We also believe the Chinese are hacking into Ukrainian networks." After experiencing outages and access issues, the group had to change its name to Raidforum2. What was the problem for original Raidforum is still unknown.

SHDWsec - Joins the pro-Ukraine movement. "SHDWSec has also joined forces with @AgainstTheWest_ First stage is now on the roll," the group said, referring to its operations against Russia. It is too late to expect us. Get ready, you will be hit. "There will be more."

ContiLeaks - Supporting Ukraine. Conti, the infamous ransomware group, has been exposed within the frames of ongoing war. Following Conti's statement of Russian support on February 27, an account called ContiLeaks has leaked hundreds of files containing internal Conti communications. The informant is supposed to be Ukrainian, and he has been leaking more and more files approximately every day. A more recent data set depicts communication as chaos within Conti. "Hello, all VM farms have been cleared and deleted, servers have been disabled," says Actor 1. "I deleted all the farms with the shredder and shut down the servers," actor 2 responds.

CONCLUSION

Nothing can be perfect, including cyber systems. If there is even one hacker, control over the system is an illusion. Ukraine's resistance and steadiness are fascinating. Russia is well-known for its very strong contingent of hackers. Reality shows, that these efforts are quite positive for Ukraine. The ministry of security and defence of Ukraine works actively and spares no effort to keep crucial information ensuring safety as much as possible. It is hard to predict what Russia might do, and it is normal. Though Ukraine makes great effort, the majority of Russia's attacks have been still successful, particularly in the 2022 series. Though, the most attacks conducted by Ukrainians had not obtained the planned results, the involvement of both hacktivists and group of hackers had extremely big influence on the consequences of ongoing war. We all agree, that hacktivists and group of hackers have made the greatest contribution and we all expect that maybe, one day they will obtain their well-deserved fame and appreciation. As expected, the main targets of the Russians are government sites and strategically important facilities. Quantitative statistics of attacks are interesting observations, and records have shown that in the initial stages of the war, the Russians were able to launch 796 attacks on Ukraine.

Russia's influence in all spheres complicates matters, as it operates without rules as well as is unaffected by regulations; for example, Russia finances hacking groups and conducts both physical and virtual warfare, though it is considered to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

The fact that war is hell is not debatable at all. Although this war still shows a lot to the world, especially in cyberspace. The ongoing cyberwar between Russia and Ukraine is the first of its kind, but it is unlikely to be the last one. This war shows us that everything filling our daily lives digitally, can very easily fall into the clutches of the enemy and simply cease its functioning (Щиголь 2022)¹¹

I agree with the experts in this field, who advise both individuals and organizations to strengthen their cyber security systems, as neglecting cybersecurity risks creates weak links in broader systems, causing catastrophic consequences.

Though, the international community has realized the real consequences of this strategy but it was too late, and is now they are desperately trying to compensate even small part of their loss. The war in Ukraine has been

9 Smith, Adam. 2022. independent.co.uk. February 28 . Accessed February 28, 2022. <https://www.independent.co.uk/tech/hackers-attack-train-putin-troops-russia-ukraine-b2024907.html>.

10 Gallagher, Ryan. 2022. bnnbloomberg.ca. February 27. Accessed February 27, 2022. <https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/belarus-hackers-allegedly-disrupted-trains-to-thwart-russia-1.1729666>.

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clearly demonstrating how hacker's military function as well. The fact is that cyberattacks can play an important role in modern warfare. Therefore, limiting Russia's access to modern technologies should be considered one of the priorities of international security.

After all, the time when it was possible to believe that someone might not be interesting will never return.

In my opinion, the states should pay more attention and therefore make more investments in the above mentioned field. According to well-known phrase "the unjust war can't be justly fought". Besides, the ongoing process and the obtained results of the current war clearly show us that a well-developed cyber system could make more profitable contribute to both current process and the outcomes of Russia-Ukraine war. Considering the results of any war, including Russian-Ukraine war, we fully agree with what Marcus Tullius Cicero said: "Unjust peace is better than unjust war". We know that the war was not Ukrainians choice, it was a trap, and there was no way to avoid it. Of course it's impossible to predict any outcome of the war in advance, but I still hope that highly skilled hacktivists together with individual hacker groups will manage to make their significant contribution, which will lead to the "expected" positive outcome of the ongoing unjust war. We have a hope...

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THE UKRAINE-RUSSIA WAR AND EUROPE'S ENERGY SECURITY

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Abstract

Since another half of 2021, there has been an edgy hike in energy costs in the EU and worldwide. The price of energies has further risen as a consequence of Russia's unprovoked and unjustified invasion against Ukraine, which has also led to enterprises related to the security of energy force in the EU. Russia's decision to suspend gas deliveries to several EU member countries has further affected the situation. But increased demand in Asia and floundering product from shale in the USA are also having an impact on it. Since Russia's aggression of Ukraine on 24th February, the geopolitical and profitable significance of energy has been plain to see. The war has brought advanced energy prices, with knock- on goods for the cost-of-living extremity in the UK and away. The first two weeks of the war, Brent prices – the European oil painting standard – increased by further than 25%. In September, The EU Commission offered to conduct, wide measures against Russia's energy demand manipulation. It offers liquidity aid for energy enterprises and proposes a cap on the price of Russian gas. EU energy ministers bandied the idea on 9 September, but handed no establishment deductions.

As the conflict unfolds in Ukraine, European political leaders are clamoring to find ways to disable the power and finances of the Russian authority. This isn't the foremost time politicians in Europe have declaimed of breaking up their reliance on Russian energy. In 2014, following Russia's annexation of Crimea, the European Council backed sweats to slash significances of gas by boosting energy effectiveness, and diversifying and elaborating domestic sources. The EU still remains just as pendulous on Russian reactionary energies. In 2021, energy was the most imported product by the EU from Russia, counting for 62% of the region's total significances.

Keywords:

War, Invasion, Sanctions, Economy, Prices.

INTRODUCTION

What does the war in Ukraine mean for the overall geopolitics of energy prices?¹

A major factor driving the sharp increase in global energy prices is the invasion of Ukraine, and European nations to reduce their reliance on Russian gas and oil. But additionally, declining shale oil production in the United States and rising demand in Asia are impacting it in some way. Considering that Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24th, the geopolitical value and profitability of energy have been made clear. The conflict has produced advanced energy costs have an extreme impact on the cost of living in the UK and abroad. In the first two weeks of the conflict, Brent prices, the benchmark for oil paintings in Europe, were high. rose by a factor of over 25%. European price of gas by the end of March were around 580% more recent than the time before. Also, this are some obtained consequences of the war as numerous Russian export payments have been accommodated by European businesses. To an unofficial Russian bank to facilitate the entry of “Roubles” (Russia’s mature state-owned energy business) by Gazprom (Russian national currency). Europe’s the mainland’s extreme reliance on foreign energy has caused conflict. The European Union (EU) member states unanimously decided to phase out the significant uses of Russian energy at their summit on March 10–11. However, in cases involving immediate warrants, societal concerns and geopolitical assessments take precedence. After five weeks of fighting, the Baltic states stopped importing Russian gas. By contrast, over the same weekend, Berlin leaders appeared on television to discuss the likely systemic repercussions of the EU’s contrived ruse of lowering energy imports from Russia. The EU has been discussing a warrants package regarding oil painting for a few weeks now without being able to come to a consensus. We can see from the war-related events that energy shock is not the only disruptive force affecting the flow of energy throughout the world. There are currently three distinct structural shocks at play, each with its own geopolitical denials. The first is caused by the unrest that Russia brought upon itself. The nation exports more natural gas than any other nation in the globe, more crude oil than any other nation, and more coal than any other nation. Around three- diggings of Russia’s gas exports go to Europe and Turkey. Most of this gas traveling westward enters via conduits. To make up for the loss of relevance in Asia, the request share in Europe that it might drop during the upcoming years. China’s gas imports from Russia will need to be diverted elsewhere, and the country’s refrigeration

The EU has taken way towards self-dependence from Russian gas. While the EU’s allowances targeting Russian gas exports have been capped, the launch of the freshly constructed Nord Stream 2 gas channel between Russia and Germany has been put off. The conflict in Ukraine appears to have had a fairly low impact on deluges of Russian gas into the euro zone therefore far, but there are signs of developed pitfalls to the euro area’s gas force. The EU thus aims to downgrade dependency on Russian gas by nearly two- thirds by the end of 2022 the “REPowerEU” arrangement. The above-mentioned arrangement aims to substitute around one- third of Russian gas by stepping up thawed natural gas significances from other suppliers similar to the United States and Qatar. Another 6 of gas should come by channel from countries similar to Norway. Gas is the energy source that several countries in the euro area find most challenging to cover, compared to oil painting and coal. as the infrastructure is still lacking to pierce many sources. Thus, nations like Germany and Italy have been defending gas agreements with other cover suppliers while also attempting to construct the mandatory structure by increasing regasification capacity. A huge rise in European gas supplies helped to drive down prices as EU countries scrambled to replace Russian gas and low demand due to modest rainfall contingencies. As payback, through April and May 2022, Russia ceased supplying gas to Poland, Bulgaria, Finland, Denmark, and the Netherlands because these countries refused to comply with its requirements that payments for gas deliveries be made in Roubles. Russia assessed allowances in May 2022 on a German Gazprom unit that the nation’s energy network controller gained control over in addition to the Polish portion of the Yamal-Europe route, which carries gas to Germany.

How the Ukraine can contribute to solve this problem.²

The biggest land mass of any element will be held by Ukraine once it joins the European Union. state with the fifth-largest population in the bloc. The magnitude of the significance of Don’t undervalue the new commonwealth that will be a part of the union. This property may applicable to the production of wind, biomass, and solar energy. According to estimates, Ukraine’s implied Currently, 667GW of energy are being produced, with 251GW of that coming from coastal wind. It can Depending on the situation; it may export between three and four gigawatts (GW) of energy. to supply 3 million homes with energy. Despite the fact that Ukraine will consume more energy when despite the fact that the energy supply to the member nations has been replenished, there is still a substantial possibility.

¹ <https://www.economicsobservatory.com/what-does-the-war-in-ukraine-mean-for-the-geopolitics-of-energy-prices/>

² [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/733643/EPRS_BRI\(2022\)733643_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/733643/EPRS_BRI(2022)733643_EN.pdf)

Wind and Solar energy³

The most significant and encouraging source of renewable energy that Ukraine might contribute to the energy mix in the EU is wind. 320 GW of onshore wind energy and up to 251 GW of coastline wind energy might be added from Ukraine's windswept homeland. The EU is currently backing off of its fit for 55 pledges to wind energy. To meet its needs, the EU requires between 433 and 452GW of wind energy, but is now only on track to produce 360GW. Ukraine might contribute to closing that deficit of about 75 GW and fully develop its potentially enormous wind energy between the years 2030 and 2050. Before the war, it was clear that the Ukrainian government wanted to fully commit to encouraging investment in wind energy if the renewable technology was to take off; once the war is over, this should be taken into consideration.

Before the conflict began, Ukraine's solar capacity was at 60 GW implicit by 2030, which is a remarkable achievement. Before the conflict started, Ukraine had installed 6.3 GW of solar power. Nowadays, a lot of Ukrainian houses and small towns use solar energy to keep the lights on because Russian military activity has cut off other electricity networks. Development can continue when the war is over, and solar energy may be the most readily accessible renewable energy for Ukraine to utilize and export as well because Ukrainian energy businesses have prior experience in structuring and enforcing it.

A lazy myth in our society is that well-run private companies don't generally act in the interests of society.

Without official government meddling, businesses in the energy sector can be influenced more effectively. It is the commercial social duty of the assiduity to assist the authority at this time and refrain from trying to thwart the temporary suspension of long-term contracts. Our society has a lazy tale that well-run private businesses don't always act in the best interests of society. In its response to this extreme, the energy assiduity must take the initiative and prove that this myth is false. The sector will benefit much in the long run in terms of societal goodwill. Everyone was reminded of the importance of realistic economics by the successful response to the COVID-19 epidemic, which focused on issues that are logical for society rather than on rarefied profitable models or, worse, a profitable testament that insisted on dogmatist request approaches for their own sake. It also served as a reminder of the influence and force of popular opinion in request husbandry when faced with an extreme empirical situation. In the Allied Countries during World War II, the wartime economists who labored assiduously to establish wartime prices and sectors assisted in producing and allocating scarce funds, maintaining the morale of their populations, and ultimately helping to win the war. In this extreme circumstance, the same can and ought to be true.

EU Seeks to Import More Gas from the Caspian Basin⁴

On June 18 of this year, the EU and Azerbaijan reached an agreement to expedite the significance of the country as part of its efforts to diversify its gas supply sources. It is necessary to increase the Southern Gas Corridor's (SGC) current capacity five times before Azerbaijani gas can compete effectively with Russian gas. However, the limited gas deposits on the Azerbaijani side, the murky legal status of the Caspian Sea, and Russia's and Iran's actions to sabotage gas import lines that go around them on the way to the EU may prove to be significant roadblocks. Poland would benefit from increased SGC transmission speeds since they would reduce the amount of Russian raw materials that would be requested by Europe.

According to the Memorandum of 18 June, the amount of gas imported by the EU from Azerbaijan will increase from the current rate of 10 billion cubic meters (BCM) each time to 12 BCM in 2023 and 20 BCM in 2027. According to the memo cited above The Southern Gas Corridor, which has been supplying Azeri gas to the EU since 2020, must be used to send the gas. The memorandum is seen as the two parties' declaration of a political choice. The specifics of the Azerbaijani gas force and the financial aspects of the SGC enlargement still need to be agreed upon.

Opportunities Related to the Potential Expansion of the SGC

The SGC now delivers less than three of the EU's natural gas imports, which limits its profitable significance for the EU (e.g., in 2021, the amount of gas imported into the EU from Russia was 15 times higher). However, the SGC is one of the methods for diversifying gas supply from the south that is most apparent politically in the EU. It is also one of the most crucial instruments of EU strategy towards the South Caucasus and Central Asia, providing the foundation for transactional relationship with Azerbaijan in the domain of raw EU supplies and opening up the possibility for collaboration with other countries in the region.

For the nations that are SGC shareholders, the SGC has economic significance. It enabled Azerbaijan, where

³ <https://www.globsec.org/what-we-do/publications/renewable-energy-ukraine-solution-european-energy-security-and-shifting-eu>

⁴ <https://www.pism.pl/publications/eu-seeks-to-import-more-gas-from-the-caspian-basin>

gas provides for 95% of exports and 75% of budget revenues, to double its gas import capacity. In Turkmenistan, gas makes up 80% of budgetary income and 95% of exports. Due to the unbalanced conditions in Afghanistan and Pakistan's Baluchistan, the western direction of gas exports would provide the nation with significantly less stability and protection of the operation of its transmission structure than systems in the Asian direction, headed by the still unrealized TAPI (Turkmenistan- Afghanistan- Pakistan-India) channel. Together with SGC, Turkey seeks to establish a means of transportation for raw materials that are shipped from the Caspian Basin to Europe. Different countries in the region who are interested in extending the SGC are also economically dependent on gas imports and products, which has led them at various points to look for European investment in the industry. They would have the opportunity to sell gas to the European demand at higher prices than the Asian demand thanks to the SGC and its implied extension to the Trans-Caspian region (about four times advanced).

The hard reality of heating households this winter

The biggest political issue that still exists is the cost of residential energy. The majority of gas is typically used by residences, however during the colder months, this usage rises sharply. Therefore, how much gas homeowners save during the upcoming slowdown will be important.

The evidence we have indicates that homes respond to higher prices, but the price increase must be significant in order to produce a meaningful response. To achieve the requested 15% reduction in consumption, it is apparently necessary to raise prices by an amount ten times larger than the requested decrease in consumption.

Politicians are hesitant to permit distribution companies to pass on advanced gas import prices because they may be difficult for lower-income households to bear. Prices have previously increased in many countries, but not by a degree that is this significant.

Nevertheless, there are clever outcomes that preserve the correct price signal without straining the budgets of low-income households. Governments might, for instance, subsidize a fixed initial quantity of energy (gas and electricity) for residences at the same price, but with high demand-based costs beginning above that level.

The quantity delivered at a low cost could be directly related to the number of occupants in the ménage. Richer people living in luxurious manors would benefit significantly less than poorer people in cramped quarters. Residents of the spacious manor would also have considerably more freedom to cut back on consumption, much like by only heating the smaller flats.

Offering homeowners an "energy savings premium" in the form of a payment for each kWh saved (compared to last time's position) is another option. This would serve as yet another incentive to cut back on gas usage. Although implementing these requirements in nations with a large number of original distribution businesses may be challenging, it is currently the most important responsibility for governments across the EU.

The importance of allowing the cost signal to function is universal. Wherever customers are prepared to pay the highest price for gas, it should be permitted to flow. It might be simpler to cut back on gas consumption in some countries than others. Therefore, there is no need for everyone to have the same reduction mark because this utilization offer is merely a hollow show of solidarity.

Lofty declarations of energy solidarity are not necessary for Europe. It only needs to allow the internal request to function, and legislators must ensure that customers accept the real cost of energy.

Gazprom: dip in production and exports, profits up⁵

Although Gazprom has drastically reduced its gas output and exports since the year's beginning, this fact has not yet had a material impact on the company's finances. According to data provided on August 30 by the deputy president of the operation board of the Pot, Famil Sadygov, the company made a profit of 2.5 trillion Russian rubles (versus 968.5 billion in January-June 2021) in the first half of this year despite a 31 drop in the volume of deals to the so-called "far abroad" The same day, Gazprom said that the board of directors would recommend paying a tip of 51 per share for the first half of the time. The good financial results are mostly due to high oil and gas prices, which are currently making up for the significant declines in import volume. Gazprom's calculations indicate that in 2021, the average gas price on the TTF Mecca was around \$568 per 1000 m3. At that time, monthly price values were much higher than the preceding indicator (for instance, 1000 m3 cost more than \$,700 on the TTF on medium in July). It is possible that the group will also see excellent financial outcomes in the second half of the year. The effects of major rises in gas spot requests and oil painting price hikes may not be apparent for several months due to the nature of the price, formulas provided in Gazprom's long-term contracts (price fluctuations occur with a daily, six-month, or

5 <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2022-09-02/gazprom-dip-production-and-exports-profits>

nine-month break). However, the extent of any additional limitations on Russian gas shipments to visitors in Europe would also have an impact on the outcome.

The monthly volumes of gas exported through the pipeline consistently exceed the agreed-upon amounts, according to Gazprom.

CONCLUSION

The global economy continues to be weakened by the war through significant disruptions in trade and food and fuel price shocks, all of which are contributing to high inflation and subsequent tightening in global financing conditions. The Europe's energy crisis will continue even after the end war. Before, the overall situation will be stabilized Relationship between Russia and Europe will not be fixed and due to that reason crisis will continue till solution will be found. On the other hand, this war also creates opportunities to discover alternative ways of energy sources and even creates new biofriendly sources, but that needs significant amount of time, due to slow development of alternative sources. Only thing, that we can do right now, is to just look at the situation, how everything goes, however, the one is for sure, this war will be good lesson for Europe, to not to be overly dependent to one country in every field, especially in energy aspect.

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CYBER SECURITY DIMENSION IN BALKAN REGION

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Abstract

Cyber security, also called digital security, is the practice of protecting digital information, devices, and assets. These include personal information, accounts, files, photos and even money. Security develops essential values for humanity such as peace, progress and human freedom. Under the conditions of the process of the globalization phenomenon, which includes all areas of existence of mankind, the issue of ensuring security both at the national and international level occupies a primary place of institutions specialized in the field.

The article reports the theoretical aspects of cyber security and its impact on the international environment, but also the international concepts and strategies related to security at the current stage against the backdrop of the realities that have emerged in the last six months on the Balkan arena. Information warfare seems to be a major part of modern conflicts.

Keywords:

Security environment, change, international relations, economy, threat

Main Part

1.1 Cyber Security and Cybercrime

In today's growing world, cyber security is very much needed because as technology provides many means to use it, there are also some effects such as security threats and cyber attacks. To protect data from hacking and cyber attacks, we need cyber security. Cyber security is the process of saving networks, computer programs and data from unauthorized access or users who seek to access user data for personal use and gain. Many organizations develop software to protect data. This software helps protect data and information. Cyber security plays a big role in the development of technology and other services such as the Internet. We only think of "cyber security" when we hear cybercrime. This document describes cyber security, cyber attack, types of cyber attacks and main areas of cyber security.

Cyber brings together the form related to information, the Internet and virtual reality. Cyber security is essential because it helps protect data from threats such as data theft or misuse, as well as protecting your system from viruses. The term cyber security is used to refer to the security offered through online services to protect your online information. As the number of people connecting to the Internet increases, so do security threats that cause enormous damage.

1.2 Cyber Security in Times of War

In this context, we will consider the security measures of the country closest to us, Ukraine, regarding cyberspace. Since the beginning of the war, Ukraine has been the target of numerous cyber attacks that have targeted government agencies, private organizations and citizens. Those businesses that are part of the critical infrastructure, such as energy, telecommunications, media and financial companies, should also be on high alert, since these industries are often considered priority targets during a war. Businesses must be prepared to counter these challenges - companies must assess their preparedness for cyber incidents and the ability to resume operations. To begin with, it is necessary to review existing response plans in order to better understand the risks of current threat scenarios that are highly likely to occur, taking into account factors such as company profile, its geography and more.

1.3 What Can Be Done

- View the landscape of potential threats to your business, connect with organizations that provide information about cyber security threats (Threat Intelligence) in order to better understand business risks and measures that need to be taken.
- Consider the possibility of suspension of activities in regions where hostilities are already taking place or it is likely that this may happen in the near future, and how to minimize these risks for the business. For example, what to do when important functions are unavailable, partly or completely of the IT infrastructure, telephone communications, etc.
- If necessary, ensure the evacuation or relocation of employees and their families, office, systems; transfer the company to a hybrid / remote work format (if this was not done during the pandemic), provide the work of a crisis headquarters to ensure the safety of people and the continuity / restoration of the company's work.
- Review incident response plans and continuity plans, ask yourself the following questions: How often are plans tested? Will test scenarios work with current threats? Update security incident response plans and create specific response plans according to major scenarios.
- Make sure that contracts with service providers for responding and deterring attacks are up-to-date;
- View all regulatory requirements regarding the need to report cyber security incidents;
- Consider proactively building relationships with law enforcement and government agencies that should be involved in a major cyber security incident;
- Consider conducting cyber attack response simulations if the exercises have not been completed within the last six months.

1.4 Cyber Defence

It makes sense to revisit key sets of cyber security controls that can help reduce the likelihood of successful attacks, including those that help protect against threats from an aggressor state or organized groups that have stepped up their activities during a war.

1.5 What Can be Done

- Prioritize the tasks of installing fixes (patches) for all critical vulnerabilities in systems - especially for those that are now actively used by attackers. The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

maintains a database of such vulnerabilities, and some cybersecurity centers provide advice on which ones to prioritize;

- Review access controls on key systems, focusing on multi-factor authentication, deletion of unused or expired accounts, and the need to isolate high-risk systems.
- Make sure that anti-malware protection is installed, licenses are up-to-date and programs are regularly updated;
- Perform an external vulnerability scan for systems that have access to the Internet and eliminate the most important flaws;

1.6 Cyber Security Monitoring

In addition to preventive protection, effective security monitoring is also important for timely detection and response to intrusion. The average time between initial compromise and the launch of destructive malware is now measured in days, rather than weeks or months as it used to be.

1.7 People

Businesses should plan for possible shutdowns in war zones and, in some cases, arrange for temporary workforce support to keep their critical services running until their employees can return to the office or country. In addition to supporting employees and their families, organizations need to be aware of the risks of organized crime. These groups are trying to take advantage of the crisis by creating fake websites that offer help or useful information or accept donations. There is a strong possibility of phishing campaigns focused on the war in Ukraine, aiming at high-ranking officials who openly express their position in relation to the war.

Conclusion

The current situation remains unpredictable – it is important for companies and organizations to constantly analyze how the situation may develop further and what scenarios may arise. For each scenario, the company must have an analysis of how a particular scenario will affect the organization, taking into account the human factor, business, supply chain and technology. However, some of the recommendations discussed can be implemented now to be prepared for such cases, increase resilience, reduce the impact and reduce the duration of incidents if they occur.

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STRENGTHENING THE EU'S DEFENCE COOPERATION

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Abstract

In an expeditiously changing world, security challenges have become more intricate, multifaceted and complex. The 21st century is an epoch of strategic competition and multisided relations. The influence and rate of occurrence of hybrid security threats are constantly rising and deepening. World is in era of transition, characterized by creating new dynamics by emerging players along with significant shift of geopolitical and economic power, and currently, global attention is drawn to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, which is the consequent catalyst for the EU states, obligating them to take more responsibility and improve security and defence. Russia does not use force only to dominate on Ukraine, but this war aims to reverse and strike down western dominance - it is a big threat-economically, militarily, and politically. In an international competition, other powers are challenging the European countries' ability to protect their interests and values that was the motivation for the idea of collective security building called "strategic sovereignty". For this reason, both defence and security fields are essentially important for the European Union. The EU leaders have long been trying to improve common defence policy - the European Union External Action Service in 2011, and later in 2016, the EU Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker called for a common defence fund, a "European headquarters." In March 2022, the EU council approved the Strategic Compass. The Compass gives the European Union an ambitious plan of action for strengthening the EU's security and defence policy by 2030 (EU, 2022. French President Emmanuel Macron urged Europe to invest in its own collective security framework in the face of Russian military moves on the bloc's doorstep - "Europe needs to finally build its own collective security framework on our continent." We argue about the prospects of collective security and the fact that it may now be time for the EU member States to take the necessary decisions.

Keywords:

security challenges, hybrid security threats, collective security, strategic sovereignty, defence policy, the Strategic Compass.

INTRODUCTION

We, human beings, tend to over-rationalize the past, over-dramatize the present and underestimate the future. Now if you look at the post-cold war era, we will see that in the beginning it was unipolar, which was driven by the undisputed superpower of the world - the United States, and at the same time, it was partially ideology-driven as well as identity-driven. That was the time when Francis Fukuyama, one of the greatest academics and intellectuals, coined the phrase at the end of history - a belief that all 200 nation-states in the world would start transitioning towards the best combination of governance that is liberal democracy, the social market economy, and globalization, and this was a genuine belief. That's why there is increasing acceptance that the European Union is becoming an important factor in foreign and security matters¹ (Smith, 2005). A significant factor in the rising importance of the EU security activities derived from the Russian-Ukrainian war² (Michael Merlingen, 2008). Inside the EU, they also have to accept to pay a price to stop this outrageous and unprovoked war: the future of European security and their democracies depends on it. The price to pay is the price of freedom.

The EU's toolkit for maintaining international security and peace includes diplomacy, humanitarian aid, development cooperation, human rights, climate action, economic support, and trade regulations. These various tools are put together in a certain way to match the unique circumstances of each crisis or emergency. The EU's so-called Integrated Approach, as outlined in the EU Global Strategy, is a customized, multifaceted strategy constantly updated to changing circumstances (European Union, 2016). When it comes to encouraging security and advancing European interests and values, all of these strengths -collectively known as Europe's soft power - are beneficial but Defence is a vital part of the EU's distinctive toolbox and is essential to safeguarding European interests both now and in the future. Because of this, a more stable basis has been created to further progress and reinforce Europe's defence cooperation.

When the UK, France and Benelux signed the Treaty of Brussels in 1948, the concept of a common defence policy for Europe first emerged. In 1948, the EU countries have been trying to improve security and defence, but crucial steps were taken when they were necessity. It was obvious that the EU needed to address its duties in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management after the end of the Cold War and the subsequent wars in the Balkans (Brussels Treaty. Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, 1948). It is essential to acknowledge that the EU has always been trying to enhance defence and security. The Western European Union Council had already approved the conditions for the deployment of military units in 1992, but the "Petersberg Tasks" was now included in the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam. For the Union to comment on foreign policy issues with "one face and one voice," the position of "High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy" was established³ (Nicolaidis, 1999).

After the Treaty of Amsterdam, there was another important moment in relations between the countries of the EU. Member States reiterated the Union's readiness to build autonomous action capabilities, supported by effective armed units during the 1999 European Council in Cologne. The "Berlin Plus Agreement," which granted the EU access to NATO resources and capabilities under specific restrictions, was a significant advance. ⁴ The Lisbon Treaty, which become valid in December 2009 and served as a fundamental factor in the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy, is another significant treaty (CSDP) when it comes to the EU defence cooperation.⁵

Several years ago, in December 2017, when the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was established, it has brought defence cooperation between the participating European Union Member States to a different level. To create a more cohesive European capacity landscape, a collaboration between the participating EU Member States will gradually transition from isolated projects to plan and impact-based cooperative activities. It is a framework and systematic procedure for progressively strengthening defence cooperation to deliver the necessary capabilities in order to carry out both the most difficult missions and consequently increase security for the EU residents. There are two other crucial initiatives: the European Defence Fund, which will provide financial support for certain collaborative projects, and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), which will assist Member States to better identify the opportunities for new collaborative initiatives.⁶ The concept of a European army is as old as the European Union and the unity of European countries. The idea of developing European defence regularly appears in the discourse of European leaders as a result of increasing security issues either in the international arena or on

1 smith, hill and. 2005.

2 Michael Merlingen, Rasa Ostrauskaite. 2008. "European Security and Defence Policy." In An implementation Perspective.

3 Nicolaidis, Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypso. 1999. "princeton.edu." march. Accessed 11 5, 2022.

4 1999. "europarl.europa.eu." june 3-4. Accessed 10 27, 2022. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/kol2_en.htm.

5 <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/5/the-treaty-of-lisbon> 2007

6 www.pesco.europa.eu/about/ 2017

the internal European political agenda, but the European Union has still been hesitant to make risky international commitments.

According to economists, the war in Ukraine is the third asymmetric shock, experienced by UN in the last two decades after the 2008 financial and economic crisis and the following Eurozone crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. The war in Ukraine is indeed having a much greater impact on neighboring countries due to the influx of refugees and their heavy dependence on Russian gas. With the invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin is forcing the EU to urgently rethink many elements of their internal organization and worldview. They must rise to this challenge to defend their security and democratic values. To handle the wider impact of the war against Ukraine, the EU needs to bolster European economic resilience, end its energy dependence on Russia and further strengthen the European defence.

According to analyses by Eurobarometer, a large percentage of the EU residents desire increased security, stability, and a coordinated EU response towards the existing dangers. The EU citizens expect the EU to gradually reduce its dependence on Russian energy sources (87%), and they strongly support a common security and defence policy (81%). The survey also confirms the overwhelming support for the EU's response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine (59%).⁷ Along with their international partners' expectations that Europe should be able to respond to crises rapidly and effectively, the recently increased degree of desire to cooperate in the domain of defence is a clear answer to this demand by European citizens.

In other words, the European Union must be able to defend its security interests and shoulder its full amount of responsibility as a guarantor of international security. Among the current processes adopting the "Strategic Compass", which is a 2030 action plan to strengthen the EU's security and defence policy, it also responds to the requirements of the European Union residents. The work on the Strategic Compass began nearly two years ago, but due to the increased dynamics of security problems and the war in Ukraine, the working version of the document was significantly updated, highlighting the European Union's collective military ambitions.

The "Strategic Compass" is an overall assessment of the EU's strategic environment, including threats and challenges. For the first time in the EU history, concrete and practical proposals with a well-defined implementation schedule are documented aiming to strengthen the EU's ability to act decisively in crises as well as to protect both its security and citizens. The Compass encompasses all aspects of security and defence policy and is built on four pillars: act, invest, partner, and secure. When a crisis emerges, the EU should be prepared to respond quickly and forcefully, with partners or alone. The EU will establish a strong EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5000 troops for different types of crises, will be ready to deploy 200 fully equipped CSDP mission experts within 30 days, including in complex environments, will conduct regular regular live exercises on land and at sea, and enhance military mobility⁸ ([https://www.eeas.europa.eu/ 2022](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/2022)).

A variety of considerations influenced the Member States' decision to cross the Rubicon as well as gave the Union independent military capability. There is a revival of war in Europe, as well as a decreased American readiness to provide security and defence assurances to Europe, which is more essential in geopolitical terms than it was during the Cold War. Many continental European nations have sought to confirm the EU's role as a global political player.⁹ (Michael Merlingen, 2008).

In the new millennium, the EU has gained prominence in security and defence issues. The Member States provided the union with a new institutional framework and major operational capabilities by creating and expanding the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy). Their goal in promoting international security and stability via preventative action and crisis management in civilian and military operations has been realized. To increase its capacities, the EU had been developing and implementing foreign and security policies.¹⁰

The debate over European security and the role of the EU, as well as its strategic partners, is raging. The recent NATO summit in Madrid was a success for the Transatlantic Alliance in terms of both strategic unity and concrete decisions. The summit reemphasized NATO's collective defence mission, including plans to strengthen the alliance's presence on the eastern flank as well as to increase the overall number of high-readiness forces. All leaders underlined their determination to support Ukraine in defending itself against the Russian aggression, until full

7 2022. "Europa.eu." eurobarometer surveys. april-may. Accessed 10 25, 2022. file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Key%20Challenges%20of%20our%20Times%20-%20The%20EU%20in%202022_526_Data_Annexes_EN.pdf.

8 2022. "Europa.eu." eurobarometer surveys. april-may. Accessed 10 25, 2022. file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Key%20Challenges%20of%20our%20Times%20-%20The%20EU%20in%202022_526_Data_Annexes_EN.pdf.

9 Michael Merlingen, Rasa Ostrauskaite. 2008. "European Security and Defence Policy." In An implementation Perspective.

10 ,¹¹ Michael Merlingen, Rasa Ostrauskaite. 2008. "European Security and Defence Policy." In An implementation Perspective.

sovereignty is restored.

The debate over the division of geopolitical responsibility and burden between NATO and the EU has a long history¹¹ (Michael Merlingen, 2008). Since the end of the Cold War, it has been clear that the development of a long-term and effective security and defence relationship between NATO and the EU is as necessary as it is unavoidable. The two organizations are linked in many ways, including strategic vision, a sense of responsibility, membership similarities, and vulnerability to security threats and challenges. Budgetary constraints bind NATO and the EU together; member governments cannot afford to maintain two separate security and defence organizations. It would also be counter-productive¹² (Competition? 2006). However, in terms of practical cooperation, the results are mixed, and the overall result is neither cooperation nor competition, but dysfunction.

Both defence and security policy are two of the most important aspects of sovereignty, and this notion has been perceived for centuries. The initial reluctance of the EU states to grant the EU such a powerful tool is surprising. We believe it is worthwhile to analyze the possibility of establishing a unified European army from today's perspective. The EU is rising as a significant security and defence actor. Russia's invasion of Ukraine with its widely spread devastation, tens of thousands of deaths, millions of refugees, possible war crimes, and narrowly avoided nuclear disaster is forcing European nations to rethink how to maintain their collective security. This makes the concept of European "strategic autonomy" and collective defence as important as it has never been since it refers to the EU's increased ability to operate independently and with preferred partners on defence and security issues. Between February and April, the European Council approved successive assistance measures under the European Peace Facility totaling €1.5 billion. The ability of the EU's 27 members to quickly agree on these key decisions demonstrates that when there is a shared understanding of the threat, the concept of European defence becomes concrete and effective¹³ (Pezard, 2022).

This situation creates all of the necessary conditions and the greatest environment for the formation of a European army. In the context of establishing a unified European army, in addition to the organizational and logistical difficulties that can be overcome in the future, it is vital to emphasize the political level, because it determines the goals and circumstances of using the army as a policy tool. In 2017, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said: "We, Europeans, truly have to take our fate into our own hands." It is worth noting that the statements of European leaders, particularly of Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel, are broad in scope. More specificity is required to gain support for the European army. In order to implement the idea we need to define the roles of the European army, the timeline, and other requirements that are necessary before the proposal can be put into practice. To deal with the challenges of today and the future, it is essential to define the political decision-making processes for the use of military force as well as to achieve agreement on the army's mission and functions. Furthermore, an agreement is required on whether a unified European military force will be used only in response to an attack on an EU Member State or preventive measures will be permitted as well. All of these are political questions, and considering the answers must necessarily precede the formation of the army because the possible and potential missions of the army must be taken into account during the organizational formation.

In the current geopolitical situation, the concept of a European army would be impractical, since Europeans would struggle to agree on a unified military leadership -especially France, not Germany, which is a nuclear power. France, unlike Germany, is a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Furthermore, because there is no "European country," the choice to send soldiers, who risk their lives is only feasible within the framework of a national decision. The EU and NATO have 27 and 30 member nations, respectively, of whom 21 are members of both, making the concept of an EU army extremely unrealistic. Parallel effort is required to bring together conflicting perspectives on geopolitical diagnosis, security perceptions, and identification of common interests in order to move on the road of tighter military cooperation. This would ultimately pave the door for a more in-depth discussion of European goals.

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12 Competition?, EU and NATO: Co-operation or. 2006. "EU and NATO: Co-operation or Competition?"

13 Pezard, Lucia Retter and Stephanie. 2022. [www.rand.org](https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/05/rethinking-the-eus-role-in-european-collective-defence.html), may 20. Accessed October 29, 2022. <https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/05/rethinking-the-eus-role-in-european-collective-defence.html>.

CONCLUSION

The challenge now is to improve the EU's strategic alliance with NATO and show how the EU can assume greater responsibility for its security. It is obvious that they are two different sides of the same coin, and three significant characteristics are appearing as we move forward:

1. They necessitate more deployable and interoperable troops capable of coping with a diverse set of threats and dangers. This means that Europeans should spend more on defence and, more crucially, spend better as a group. The EU Member States' statement that they will raise defence expenditure by around €200 billion is highly positive. However, there is a risk that much of the increased expenditure may be lost, unless the share spent on cooperative development and procurement grows. The defence investment gap study delivered to the EU leaders in May indicates both the magnitude of the problem and what may be done, as the Commission and the European Defence Agency aiding Member States are moving forward with joint procurement. One important example is the rebuilding of stocks depleted by the shipment of military equipment to Ukraine. Acquiring capabilities collaboratively not only benefits the EU's security and defence agenda, but it is also essential for NATO Allies to secure Europe from Russian threats.

2. Second, demonstrating a desire to employ the essential capabilities and serve as a security provider is just as vital as gaining them. Over the previous two decades, the EU has gathered substantial expertise in crisis management activities. What has begun in the Balkans has developed into a potent instrument, with the EU today conducting 18 missions and operations - 11 civilian and 7 militaries across three continents.

3. This gets us to the third factor: the EU's ability to adapt and learn from their mistakes. The velocity of change in the world frequently outpaces our ability to keep up. They must improve their agility and ability to apply lessons learned, including in the field of CSDP. The Strategic Compass is vitally pertinent to this debate, and it contains actual ideas as well as a timeframe enhancing their combined influence.

The overall point is simple: in a dangerous world, Europeans must assume their strategic responsibility, both within the EU and NATO and give themselves the means and agility to do so ¹⁴ (BORREL n.d.).

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THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM IN PEACEBUILDING AND PREVENON OF MODERN CONFLICTS

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Abstract

The clash of cultures between the populations has been a reality existing since the beginning of humanity. When two different people, coming from different lands and having different cultures meet together in unexpected situations, the end of this meeting is often bloody. The fact is people are scared of the things, the phenomenon or the other people they don't know. And when we are scared of something we don't know, the first, the most primitive and the most natural reaction to this is to try to exterminate it in order to save our own life.

The present article deals with the clash of cultures in Europe as well as with the war between the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan.

Keywords:

clash of cultures, confrontation, peacebuilding, modern conflicts.

Introduction

1. The clash of cultures in Europe, cause of the rise of extremist movements and terrorist attacks

The same thing, in other context and other proportions, happens between the populations. The only difference is that in the case of the populations, the consequences are often tragic accompanied by the loss of human lives. Rome, by exterminating the Galatians who were weaker but tried to resist, proved that the fear drives people to kill even those who are weaker than you. Sometimes, fear comes from the feeling of the threat more than from a real danger.

Time changes, but the issues remain the same. Nowadays in Europe, people are confronted to the question we can call “the clash of cultures between the populations”.¹

This issue emerged during the 20th century, when people from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa came to Europe in a post-war period in order to rebuild the destructions caused by the Second World War and to have a better future. At the beginning it was mainly an immigration of workers that was needed by the European countries. But after some decades, facilitated by the process of globalization, that employment-based immigration was followed by a massive immigration. Very fast, this immigration began to be felt in the European cities due to the difference of cultures, ethnicity and religion that was noticeable for the local population. For some Europeans, this situation urged them to join the extremist movements that were strictly against the presence of the immigrated populations in Europe.

But the same issue was visible, for example, in the immigrated Muslim populations in Europe. Some Muslims were taking part in the activities of extremist movements, executing terrorist attacks in the European countries. As an example, on January 7, 2015, and on November 13, 2015, multiple terrorist attacks took place in France.² As a consequence, a lot of people lost their lives in the tragic events of Charlie Hebdo and the Bataclan. So, extremism in Europe is a reality concerning both local people and immigrated populations. Without any doubt, it is the main consequence of the clashes between the populations, because it is the result of ethnic, religious and cultural differences. But the cultural clash between the populations wasn't only an interethnic problem which opposed people in a same country; it also led to the biggest Cold War of the 20th century.

Main Part

2. Collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning of new wars - another example of the clash of cultures in Europe

After the Second World War and the victory of Allies, a new world was born with new ideological principles and, naturally by the same time, with new confrontations between the world's powerful states. One of these confrontations was the opposition between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. This opposition led to the biggest Cold War of our modern history. Both were threatening each other with nuclear weapons, producing weaponry in large quantity and accusing each other of perpetual provocations. This confrontation, combined with the Perestroika,³ led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning of new territorial claims by several populations who wanted to become or just became independent.

This event was the prelude of new wars in the post-Soviet newly independent countries. As an example, the claims of the people of Abkhazia to be independent in the territory of Georgia led, in 1992, to one of the first wars in the post-Soviet countries. As another example, we can talk about the fight of Chechen people with the Russian Federation in order to get independence as well.

In many times, these claims of independence were mainly based on ethnic and religious differences that is another example of the clash of cultures between the populations. However, one of the bloodiest wars of the post-Soviet countries was certainly the war between the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan.

3. The conflict between the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan - an actual tragedy for more than 30 years

1 H. James. The Clash of Cultures. DEMOCRACY AND SOCIETY. 2022 // <https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/democracy-and-society/the-clash-of-cultures-5642/>

2 <https://www.britannica.com/event/Paris-attacks-of-2015>

3 Perestroika and Glasnost. R. G. Gidadhubli. Economic and Political Weekly. Vol. 22, No. 18 (May 2, 1987), pp. 784-787// <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4376986>

Nagorno-Karabakh is a land inhabited by the Armenians for thousand years. Historically, this land was under the control of several Armenian princes, who enjoyed the autonomous authority even during the reign of the Persian kings. Until 18th century, these princes reigned the land of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh), but after the conquest by the Russian Tsar, Artsakh was incorporated into the Elizavetpol Governorate. In 1920, Artsakh was still inhabited by more than 90% of Armenians, and the historical and cultural city of Shusha also counted a large majority of Armenians. During the same year, a terrible massacre of the Armenian population of Shusha was organized by the Muslim Tatars (Azerbaijanis). It led to the death of more than 20,000 Armenians and as a consequence, almost the entire Armenian district of Shusha was burned and the majority of the Armenians was killed out. One year after this event, Artsakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan were under the control of the Soviet Union and at the request of the Turkish government, Stalin transferred Artsakh to Azerbaijan in order to improve the relationship of the Soviet Union with the new Republic of Turkey.

The Karabakh Committee was a movement emerged in 1988 and principally composed of Armenian intellectuals who were de facto recognized by the population as their leaders. The Committee began its activities when the populations of Armenia and Artsakh asked the Soviet government for the right of self-determination in Artsakh. The Soviet government remained almost silent on this question and the autonomous government of Artsakh, based in Stepanakert (the capital of the country), organized a voting on the independence of the small republic. More than 90% of the population wanted to become independent, particularly after the politics of Azerbaijan trying to expel the Armenians of Artsakh as they did in the autonomous region of Nakhitchevan, where more than 40% of Armenians were living before entering under the control of Azerbaijan.⁴

After the referendum that wasn't in the favor of Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijanis started to exterminate the Armenians of Sumgait, Kirovabad, Baku, and several other cities. The pogroms killed hundreds of Armenians in their own houses and caused the emigration of hundreds of thousand Armenians. After all these appeals, the Soviet regime chose the adversary camp and, in 1991, it was the beginning of the operation "Ring". It was the first attempt of the Soviet regime and the Azerbaijanis to take the land of Artsakh by force. Men, women, children, all were executed without any distinction and their houses were burned. Very fast, the Armenian villagers started to organize themselves by defending their villages and their families. People still hoped that their brothers and sisters would win the war in Artsakh and be able to live peacefully in their own land.

In 1994 a ceasefire agreement was signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and a long and hard period of negotiations began. Armenia and Artsakh wanted the recognition of Artsakh as a free Republic, and Azerbaijan wanted Armenia to give the regions surrounding Artsakh, which were taken by the Armenians during the war, without any guarantee of recognition. The fact was that these regions were connecting Artsakh to Armenia and they were particularly ensuring the security of the new Republic. The Minsk Group took responsibility for negotiation process and peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.⁵ After the ceasefire agreement in 1994 and until the war of 44 days in 2020, several attempts of dialogue were initiated between both sides, but all were unproductive due to the intransigence of Azerbaijan concerning the recognition of the Republic of Artsakh. Armenia still insists on the fact that the people of Artsakh, who are directly concerned by the question, have the right to participate in negotiations but the requests of Armenia remain still unanswered by the Minsk Group and Azerbaijan still refuses this eventuality. Despite all the negotiations conducted, in September 27, 2020, Azerbaijan chose to resolve this issue by force by attacking the Republic of Artsakh. The 44 days war killed more than 10,000 people and both sides suffered from thousands of injured people. Artsakh lost more than 70% of its territory, including the Armenian regions of Hadrout and Shusha. It was the bloodiest war after the ceasefire agreement of 1994. On November 9, 2020, on the intervention of the Russian Federation, a new ceasefire agreement was signed. This event was particularly adverse for the Minsk Group because it proved that the other members of the group, including the other two director members (France and USA) weren't in position to do anything. After that, the influence of the Minsk Group on the question of Artsakh was strongly weakened.

Conclusion

In conclusion, different examples of the clash of cultures between populations were examined. The wars, the confrontations between people, are also tragic consequences of this clash. The war between the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan was examined in this presentation because it is a very realistic fact that corresponds to the main subject. However, we still hope that one day that issue will get out of the impasse and both people will be able to live together.

⁴ <http://www.nkr.am/en/karabakh-national-liberation-movement>

⁵ <https://www.osce.org/mg>

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EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND MODERN CONFLICTS”

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Abstract

In the environment of international protection in Europe, there are considerable problems caused exclusively by the opposition between Russia and NATO countries, the impairment of relationship between Russian Federation and European countries as well as the contemporary conflict in the East of Ukraine.

The principal argumentation for the confrontation, disaffection and combat between the states is that after the end of the Cold War, European countries failed to constitute an all-inclusive security action plan in Europe that would include Russia.

The purpose of this paper is to appreciate what risks are related with the current situation. It deals only with problematic issues and does not attempt to establish the degree of guilt of each of the parties.

It is possible to consider the current political positions of Russia and Western countries on the European continent from different points of view, and this topic is beyond the scope of this study.

There is an international security threat in Europe, not directly associated to the conflict between Russia and the West but mentioning the problem of illegal migration and terrorism will suffice.

This paper deals only with the topics that underlie the confrontation between Russia and the West. Among them, there are the military confrontation between Russia and NATO countries and the conflict in Ukraine.

This study is based on an analysis of the most important factors and the main trends that determine the policy of Russia, the United States and the leading European powers. The main objective of the study is to develop realistic risk management recommendations for both parties that will help to gradually reduce the severity of the situation and move towards some new state of political stability.

Keywords:

political positions, international security, confrontation, modern conflicts

Introduction

The European security architecture has formed at two levels: first, at the level of the Transatlantic Alliance under the auspices of NATO. Secondly, at the European level, through contradistinctive initiatives spearheaded by the European Community and later by the European Union. The following is a brief analysis of the diverse structures.

The European security architecture accepted at the start of the Cold War was based on a balance of conventional forces and nuclear deterrence. The idea was not only to end large-scale aggression, but also to limit dispensable conflicts within the continent. Declaring that they “resolved to combine their exertion for collective defence and the preservation of peace and security,” the 12 founding members of NATO signed the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, making the alliance the main provider of security for the West. Seventy years later, the challenges facing NATO have changed significantly. However, the core of the Transatlantic Security Alliance still rests on three pillars: common interests and values; political cohesion; and sharing the burden of collective defence.

In the post-Cold War conflict era, the Alliance has evolved into an outward-oriented system from its Cold War agenda of a military coalition designed to wage war against the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact.¹ During this period, NATO expanded to become an organization of 30 member states. It undertook a diverse operation outside of its traditional areas of interest. It also modified itself for expeditionary interventions and acted as an integrator of forces in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. To strengthen its eastern flank, after the 2014 Crimean crisis, it opened new command centers in eight member states: Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. It also strengthened his defences in the Black Sea region by creating a new multinational force in Romania.

During the Cold War, Europe’s security was guaranteed by the United States and NATO, which gave the nascent European community time for political and economic integration. However, at the European level, attempts have been made to create a defence identity for the European community. The first such attempt dates back to the 1950s with the French proposal for a European Defence Community; however, this initiative was not successful. A second attempt was made in the 1970s with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The military component of the document defined the security architecture of the European regions as: first, to refrain from using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state; secondly, to consider inviolability of the borders of each other, as well as the borders of all states in Europe; thirdly, to respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating states; and fourthly, to refrain from making each other’s territory an object of military occupation. No such occupation or acquisition was deemed lawful. This was followed by the 1990 CSCE Charter of Paris for a New Europe, in which the signatories “fully recognized the freedom of states to choose their own security arrangements”.

With the creation of the EU, European defence integration gained momentum. In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty founded the EU, centered on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP covered all areas of security and foreign policy. The common policy idea was that “EU Member States claim their weight at the international level.” The work undertaken in this context has mainly concerned civilian crisis management missions.

In the second decade of the 21st century, several issues have made the EU seriously consider resurrecting its defence program. These were, firstly, the Crimean crisis of 2014; second, the 2016 Brexit vote that left the EU without a major military contributor; and thirdly, the ambivalence of US policy towards Europe. These developments have led the EU to realize that it will have to take on more responsibility for its own defence. In 2016, the EU published the European Union’s Global Foreign and Security Policy Strategy to set out its vision for independent security architecture.²

In an attempt to increase its military capabilities, in 2017 the EU launched a comprehensive defence package that includes four areas: first, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) with the aim of increasing cooperation between EU Member States in various formats, such as joint training and exercises or the acquisition and development of military equipment. Second, the Coordinated Annual Defence Review, which aims to monitor Member States’ defence plans to help coordinate spending and identify possible joint projects. Third, the European Defence Fund, which aims to coordinate and increase national investment in defence research and improve interoperability between national armed forces.

It cannot be denied that the Ukrainian crisis has become a critical moment for the European security architecture. On the one hand, this led to the unification and strengthening of NATO, and on the other hand, it led to the EU and its Member States making some key policy decisions in terms of defence integration.

1 Euronews- <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/03/10/eu-leaders-meet-in-versailles-to-discuss-the-ukraine-war>., accessed on 14.10.2022, at 16:17.

2 “Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)”, German Federal Foreign Office- <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/europe/gsvp>., accessed on 08.10.2022, at 10:11.

Research result

In the context of the Ukrainian crisis, NATO has faced the most difficult challenge to the European security architecture since its inception.³ However, the crisis led to the strengthening of the alliance. One of the key outcomes of the crisis is to strengthen NATO's eastern borders – during an extraordinary leaders summit in March 2022, NATO announced that it would double the number of Enhanced Forward Presence missions to eight, with new battlegroups for Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria to “strengthen allied deterrence and defence” in the region. In 2017, NATO approved the deployment in the Baltic States and Poland.

Apart from this, NATO also deployed parts of its Response Force for the first time as a defensive measure in response to a crisis. It is a multinational force made up of allied land, air, sea and special forces that can rapidly deploy to support the NATO alliance. In addition, NATO also helps coordinate Ukraine's requests for assistance and supports allies in the delivery of humanitarian and non-lethal aid. Individual Member States directly send military assistance to Ukraine, such as weapons, ammunition, medical supplies and other vital military equipment.

The crisis has resulted in the EU becoming an active player, both regionally and globally. During the crisis, the EU has shown unprecedented unity and determination to act quickly. The Union has mobilized all available tools, from sanctions to diplomacy, military support and humanitarian aid. Three key aspects of its response to the crisis include: first, the activation of the European Peace Fund to support the Ukrainian armed forces. In addition, with regard to steps to increase defence cooperation, the EU announced the establishment of a rapid reaction force as part of its Strategic Compass. Second, it imposed coordinated sanctions against Russia. In total, the US and EU have imposed five rounds of sanctions on Moscow, which cover individual and economic measures, exclusion of large Russian banks from the swift system, etc. The sixth round of sanctions, which includes an embargo on Russian oil, is still under discussion. To support the people in Ukraine directly, the EU also announced an important humanitarian and financial aid package.

The second Key Outcome was a further push by Member States to increase their defence spending.⁴ According to the Military Balance 2022, the past few years have seen a steady rise in European defence spending. The Ukrainian crisis gave this an extra boost when Member States announced further increases in their military spending, for example Belgium announced a spending increase from 0.8% to 1.52% over the next nine years. In addition, other Member States, such as Romania, Latvia, and Poland have planned to increase their defence spending by 2.3-2.9% of their GDP.

Balance of Forces and Current Trends 2014 was the last year for the security structure that has developed in Europe after the end of the Cold War. The immediate cause of its collapse was the Ukrainian crisis, but the process of destruction itself was primarily due to the fact that in the quarter of a century that has passed since the end of the Cold War, the West and Russia have not been able to create a comprehensive security system on the European continent on terms acceptable to all parties. The conflict in Ukraine put an end to cooperation between Russia and the West, which has already been fading away since the mid-2000s.

The conflict that continues in and around Ukraine is a key factor in the current instability and instability in Europe, but, as before, it is based on contradictions in approaches to the system of regional and international security. In fact, the main parties to this conflict are the United States and Russia. Washington insists that NATO should be the cornerstone in the system of international security in Europe, while Moscow focuses on creating geopolitical buffers in Europe so that its security is not endangered by NATO. According to Moscow, the European countries that are part of the NATO bloc cannot be neutral; they are secondary participants in the conflict. And although the main confrontation is unfolding between Russia and the United States, relations between the countries of Europe and Russia have seriously deteriorated.

This conflict can be called a cold, but not a new cold war: the political, economic, social and ideological situation in Europe is very different from that which developed in the 1940s-80s, so too literal an analogy is misleading. This is a different type of conflict, which can be described using the now popular expression “hybrid war”. This new asymmetric form of confrontation is characterized by political antagonism of the parties and mutual moral rejection, economic restrictions, fierce information and psychological struggle, cyber attacks and other forms of subversion. Its hallmarks are inseparable: there is no Berlin Wall, the action takes place over a wide area, and it uses the latest technologies, from social networks to cyber weapons. Unlike the conflicts of the first half of the 20th century, this type of conflict is very dynamic and develops in an integrated global environment.⁵

3 “Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg”, Extraordinary NATO Heads of State and Government Summit - https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_193613.htm, accessed on 03.10.2022, at 18:32.

4 Coordinated Annual Defence Review, European Defence Agency- <https://eda.europa.eu>, accessed on 29.09.2022, at 23:04.

5 Jamie Shea- „Friends of Europe” - <https://www.friendsofeurope.org>, accessed on 17.10.2022, at 12:10.

Once again, we note that, compared with the Cold War period, the risk of an armed conflict between Russia and NATO countries has noticeably decreased, although it has not become so insignificant that it can be neglected. Already today there is a military confrontation along the western borders of Russia. The dividing line from the Baltic to the Black Sea runs not so much through the territory of Europe as along the borders between European countries and Russia. The annexation of the Crimea is not recognized by Ukraine or other countries. The armed conflict in Donbass has escalated into a full-scale war. There remains the risk of incidents involving combat aircraft and ships of Russia and NATO countries, as well as an incorrect assessment of the situation by the military and political leadership of these states.

Hybrid warfare is by no means a short-term phenomenon; it can continue for many years. Although the advantage in forces - economic, financial, technological and informational, as well as in the potential of conventional weapons and other factors - is on the side of the West, the outcome of a hypothetical armed conflict cannot be considered predetermined.

The inequality of the military potentials of the parties is combined with the asymmetry of military-political stakes - for the Russian leadership, they are much higher. The political systems of Western countries are much more resistant to subversion from outside than the stereotypes of mass consciousness. The real problems of the West are connected with internal factors.

The current conflict between Russia and the West is very dynamic and is developing in an integrated global environment.⁶

Political systems and societies in the US and Europe are themselves undergoing a period of transformation, which is likely to have an impact on US foreign policy and relations between Washington and Europe. The United States is in the process of transitioning from global dominance to some kind of global superiority, but despite the fact that competition in the world is intensifying, Washington is forced to devote more attention to its own country than to maintaining an American-led world system. The European Union is faced with the need for its own transformation, restarting the European project and finding ways to reach the agreement between the various participants in an increasingly skeptical society. As America continues to focus on its domestic issues, Europe may increasingly see itself as a whole in terms of its strategic interests. Thus, the outcome of the hybrid warfare will, in all likelihood, be determined by the results of the internal development of Europe, Russia and the United States.

It is true that the Ukrainian crisis has changed the strategic outlook for European integration by highlighting the multidimensional nature of security issues and has given Member States a new impetus to further strengthen their defence capabilities. In the short term, various Member States announced increases in defence spending, supported Ukraine with military and humanitarian aid, and imposed sanctions against Russia. However, in the long term, critical efforts must be made to strengthen the deterrence of NATO, on the one hand, and at the European level.

The Ukrainian crisis has given Member States renewed momentum for reform, as evidenced by the EU's response, but as the crisis drags on, the question arises whether this momentum will continue for further integration or it will be considered as a reflex reaction to the crisis in the neighborhood. This is primarily because the idea of increasing European defence spending as defence integration is not new.⁷

European countries, even those that have traditionally advocated the normalization of relations with Russia, demonstrated exemplary unity in the implementation of sanctions against Russia and cracks began to appear in this unity. We are talking about a ban on the import of Russian oil. Even after intense negotiations, Member States failed to reach an agreement on an oil embargo. The main issue remains a six-month deadline for the complete phase-out of Russian crude oil, and then all oil products by the end of the year.

The Ukraine crisis has also given NATO momentum to strengthen itself further, but as European states move towards a more independent defence policy, the question arises of NATO's relevance to European partners. Critics argue that EU-initiated policies forced Member States to share their limited resources between the EU and NATO, thereby making them competitors. For example, the EU defence initiative, PESCO, prioritizes the development of EU defence requirements over allowing NATO Member States to jointly develop new weapons. Since most EU Member States are members of the Alliance, it is essential that NATO cooperate with European strategic institutions to strengthen European security.⁸

However, Europe is still far from achieving strategic autonomy. There are basic issues of finding the po-

6 BBC-<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61066503>, accessed on 27.09.2022, at 18:26.

7 "EU Budget: Strengthening the role of the EU as a provider of security and defence services", European Commission-https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_4121, accessed on 21.10.2022, at 14:44.

8 "European Defence vs. NATO: The Wrong Fight", Politico., accessed on 08.10.2022, at 19:47.

litical will, technical capabilities and financial resources to turn the EU into a militarily independent bloc capable of resisting Russia and acting independently of the US. While EU leaders are pushing for an independent defence policy, there is an awareness that a credible European defence will take a long process to emerge. It is too early to say that the Ukrainian crisis represents a historic turning point in European integration and that the momentum for the emerging security architecture in the region will continue into the future.

Conclusion

The ideal state of security in Europe can be described as the complete absence of violence or threat in relations between the countries. That's the way things are inside today European Union and NATO.

New confrontation between Russia and Western countries, often referred to as hybrid warfare, is systemic and will continue for many years to come. This phenomenon has deep roots, and it is impossible to get rid of it quickly and without problems.

Serious shifts in the global arena may affect the current situation. However, more important and relevant will be internal changes that will affect the main participants in international processes: the European Union, Russia and the United States. Each of them faces serious problems and tasks in the 21st century, which can be effectively solved only with the help of internal changes. If, as a result, the countries of the West, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, can find ways and means to eliminate differences, Europe will be able to come to a new format of political equilibrium.

From a practical point of view, strengthening the security regime in Europe comes down to taking appropriate precautions to prevent incidents, miscalculations and other events that could lead to an escalation of the conflict and even a direct military clash between Russia and NATO countries.

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3. Coordinated Annual Defence Review, European Defence Agency- <https://eda.europa.eu.>, accessed on 29.09.2022, at 23:04.
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„THE IMPACT OF THE SYRIAN CONFLICT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY“

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Abstract

Syrian issue of 2011 caused several problems in the region and on a global scale. It has turned out to be a particularly significant dare for the European state because the flow of migrants along with the borders of the European Union posed a major security challenge related to their strategic culture and politics. The large flow of displaced people into Syria is the reason that made Syria be in the center of the attention of international community. European countries have different responses. They faced a dilemma. One of them was to control the outpouring of refugees fleeing war and oppression in Syria and the other was to deal with the growing threat of terrorism, mainly the ISIL. In 2015, approximately 490,280 Syrian refugees arrived in Europe by sea. Accordingly, the internal political situation of the European Union has become considerably tense. Even though non-governmental organizations provide active humanitarian aid to the victims, the main problem remains the process of their integration into the new society. It is interesting to see how the European leaders have reacted on the influx of large numbers of migrants from Syria, threatening security of the European Union.

Keywords:

The refugee crisis, Security of Europe, politics.

INTRODUCTION

Prerequisites and consequences of the Syrian conflict in Europe

Any conflicts may have lots of different reasons, but the main one is the malfunctioning of the system and structures. The situation in Syria has grown to be a very complicated mixture of terrorism, civil war, proxy fighting, and direct regional and international confrontation. Syria faced the worst drought in modern history from 2006 to 2010. Reduced precipitation and rising temperatures have caused desertification and the degradation of agricultural sphere, especially in eastern Syria, while 800,000 people lost their livelihoods and were killed 85% of the nation's livestock. Climate change has contributed to as well as exacerbated Syria's escalating political crisis. As a result, the hundreds of thousands of farming families were forced to live in poverty leading them to mass migration to the different cities. It is believed, that the situation became incredibly tense among the populace, because of increased discontent, risen poverty levels and intolerable conditions of the country. The Syrian civil conflict cannot be discussed without the "Arab Spring". Several primarily Muslim nations, including Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, and Bahrain, experienced the so called "Arab Spring," a wave of pro-democracy revolutions. Inspired by the "Arab spring" peaceful protests started in March. It started as a peaceful protest with public demonstrations calling for democratic reforms. The Syrian war has involved a wide range of parties: The battle started as a Syrian uprising against the Syrian government and its president, Bashar al-Assad. Since then, several groups have joined the combat, many of which are engaged in a confrontation with each other. These groups included the free Syrian army (FSA), Kurdish rebel fighters so-called Islamic State, Hezbollah, and the Syrian democratic forces (SDF). Also we want to mention that Russia and Iran have assisted Syrian government at the same time the opposition has been supported by Turkey, several western powers and some gulf Arab states.¹ (Laub 2021) Russia has given Assad crucial diplomatic assistance. In September 2015, by deploying its own air force, Russia directly entered the fight. Despite Moscow's claims that its airstrikes would primarily target the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, experts said it frequently struck other rebel groups, supported by the United States and many of which had close relationship with al-offshoot Qaeda's front lines with the government. This assisted Assad in strengthening his control of the major population centers along the western spine of the nation.

We have previously discussed the key causes of the Syrian crisis as well as the key players actively involved in it. In the anarchic international order nations act based on their interests and security. We know that the European Union's primary objective is to defend its population and maintain peace, thus it is interesting to see how the European Union responded to the Syrian war.

„The European Council saluted the peaceful and dignified expression by the Tunisian and Egyptian people of their legitimate, democratic, economic, and social aspirations which are in accord with the values the European Union promotes for itself and throughout the world. The European Council emphasized that the citizens' democratic aspirations should be addressed through dialogue and political reform with full respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms, and through free and fair elections”² (COUNCIL, EUROPEAN 2011). In the aforementioned statement, the European Union reiterates both its opposition to all forms of violence and its stance on the Syrian issue. Since the very beginning of the crisis of 2011, the EU has steadily increased its assistance to the nations in the area. Without peace and security, sustained growth is impossible. The EU froze the draft Association Agreement and discontinued bilateral cooperation programs between the EU and the Syrian government under the European Neighborhood Policy when the crisis broke out in 2011. Syria-related loan transactions and technical support have been halted by the European Investment Bank. Additionally, the EU has attempted to sway the Damascus government by gradually enlarging specific restrictive measures and severely harming companies with ties to the regime.³ (Union, European 2016). The EU imposed a complete arms embargo on Syria in May 2011 that prohibited the export of any weapons, military hardware, or other items that may be used for domestic repression. When the uprising started in 2011, Europe's main instrument to influence Syria was the Eu-Syria Association Agreement. The EU capitalized on this by imposing a variety of economic penalties on Syria, as the fundamental objective of the aforementioned agreement was a collaboration between the EU and Syria, particularly in the economic and social spheres. “For the European Union, Syria is a key factor in regional stability, on account of being a transit country between Europe and the Middle East”⁴ (Tejero 2022). Indeed, the European Union's swift and rapid response was caused by Syria's essential role in the area. As a result of the confrontation, there were established several units, significantly contributing to the humanitarian needs of the populace. The European Union established the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (Madad Fund) in order to enable a more swift and flexible response to changing needs. The fund's

1 Laub, Zachary. 2021. "Syria's Civil War: The Descent Into Horror." 03 17. <https://www.cfr.org/article/syrias-civil-war>.

2 2011. "COUNCIL, EUROPEAN." 02 04. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119145.pdf.

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4 Tejero, María. 2022. <https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/the-role-of-the-eu-in-the-syrian-conflict-and-the-hunt-for-a-new-strategy>. 05 08.

main goal was to support the resilience of Syrian refugees as well as assist the communities hosting both and their administrations. Since the beginning of the conflict, the European Union has called on the Assad administration to refrain from attacking civilians, as they aimed to exacerbate the crisis and make the current situation intolerable.

As we are representatives of military field, the main and most intriguing issue is European Union's reaction to the crisis in Syria from a military point of view. It is crucial to describe the positions and responses of several nations, notably France and Great Britain. Following the attacks in Paris in November 2015, France increased its military presence in Syria and carried out airstrikes on jihadist command centers, recruiting hubs, weapons storage facilities, and fighter training camps close to Raqqa. This came after France's earlier decision to launch both surveillance missions over Syria and airstrikes against Syrian targets in September 2015. For the first time in history, France also referred to Article 42(7) of the Lisbon Treaty's mutual defence provision, which calls for other EU members to support France in its battle against ISIL/Da'esh. The option of military intervention was rejected by the UK Parliament in August 2013. But a year later, it gave the go-ahead for operations against ISIL/Da'esh in Iraq, including bombings and maybe soldiers to help with Peshmerga training in both Iraq and the Kurdistan region.⁵ (Conflict in Syria 2016). Such activation of the European countries is another clear sign that the Syrian conflict has a great impact on the security of the European Union. This issue is still critical and the results of the Syrian civil war still affect the current processes in the European Union. As we have mentioned at the beginning of our work, the civil war in Syria is complex. Therefore the consequences and challenges caused by the conflict are diverse, it goes beyond the framework of economic and political fields creating a humanitarian crisis on a global scale. We can talk endlessly about the numbers and statistics related to the Syrian conflict. These statistics are worrying not only for Syria, but for the entire world, many people have perished in the conflict, many have lost their homes, many young people have been left without education and they do not have the proper conditions to live peacefully and safely. That is why millions of Syrian citizens left the country, and this caused another, the most important problem for Europe - the mass flow of migrants, which we will talk about more specifically.

The mass flow of migrants and European States' Responses

After the Syrian civil war, a large number of migrants—not just from European countries—gathered at the borders of Europe. According to definition of “refugee” “they are persons who are outside their country of origin for reasons of feared persecution, conflict and violence.”⁶ (Nations n.d.) Accordingly, Syrian refugees are compelled to flee their own countries and seek asylum in other countries. Anyone who applies the asylums, regardless of gender, age, or ethnicity, is considered to be an “asylum seeker” and of course, they have legal right to do so. The fact that applicants submit the application for refugee status does not mean that they are going to stay in foreign country forever. They just want to obtain legal right to live and work in foreign country for a short time. After World War II, the problem of Syrian refugee became one of the most serious concerns for Europe. The majority of Syrians arrived at Europe's borders by crossing the Mediterranean Sea, although many perished and did not make it. “April 20 – Over 600 people drowned in the Mediterranean when their boat capsized shortly before midnight on April 18 in Libyan waters some 180 kilometers south of Italy's Lampedusa Island. A subsequent Italian and Maltese rescue operation ultimately could only save some 50 of an estimated 700 people on board.”⁷ (Spindler 2015). Instead of coming together to solve the existing problem, the countries of Europe have broken up. Several factors hindered the entry of migrants into Europe. One of the essentials was their Muslim origin. Their gender and age were also significant in society. It is worth mentioning that, according to Pew Research Center statistics, more than half (53%) of the migrants who arrived in Europe in 2015 were between the ages of 18 and 34, with 74% of them being men.⁸ (Connor 2016).

Europe has demonstrated that it was unable to handle a big influx of migrants. A significant influx of refugees in Europe heightens selfishness and incites nationalism. There were also some dangers to the social, cultural, and economic sectors. There was a possibility of terrorism, the breakdown of governmental institutions, and the integration of these individuals in general. Terrorist events in Paris (November 13, 2015) and Brussels (March 22, 2016) aided the public's cultivation of extremist opinions regarding refugees. It should be emphasized that if we take each of these factors into account, we will receive a different image. Even if the EU accepts all 4 million migrants and 100% of them were Muslim, the percentage of the Muslim population will increase from 4% to only 5%. This is not a dramatic change and it will not turn Europe into a Muslim territory.

The gathering of so many refugees at the borders of Europe caused a moral panic in society, which was first de-

5 2016. “Conflict in Syria.” 01. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573924/EPRS_BRI\(2016\)573924_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573924/EPRS_BRI(2016)573924_EN.pdf).

6 Nations, United. n.d. “united nations.” refugeeemigrants definition. <https://refugeemigrants.un.org/definitions>.

7 Spindler, William. 2015. December 8. <https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2015/12/56ec1ebde/2015-year-europes-refugee-crisis.html>.

8 Connor, Phillip. 2016. “pewresearch.” August 2. <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/08/Pew-Research-Center-Europe-Asylum-Report-FINAL-August-2-2016.pdf>.

defined by Stanley Cohen as a term. "Societies appear to be subject, now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person, or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; the moral barricades are manned by editors, politicians, and other right-thinking people"⁹ (EduBirdie n.d.),

Particularly striking is Poland, whose borders have seen the greatest influx of refugees. There were two fundamental divisions within society. One of them advocated for the defence of their nation and sense of self, while the other could not abandon human ideals and insisted on being included. A similar conflict between liberalism and conservatism might be seen in the opposition of a xenophobic society versus a tolerant culture. The parliamentary elections in Poland, which had both proponents and opponents of migrant admittance go to the streets, worsen the problem. Following the triumph of the right-wing party, Poland prohibited refugees to cross its borders, causing tremendous dissatisfaction in Europe among the nations that allowed them in. All of these above mentioned fact, demonstrated that there was still a ongoing dispute between the European nations. Poland has never welcomed refugees in general.

Multiculturalism and a lost values were the main reasons that made Poland reject migrants. Despite the fact that in the 1930s, Poland was not fully democratized, this has led to the emergence of certain xenophobic ideas in the society.

Nonetheless, Poland was generally a cosmopolitan state with a tolerant nature even towards Muslims. The government's most significant declaration was that due to the high risk of terrorist attacks, it could not accept Muslim migrants. "The rise of Islam and the threat of terrorism posed the greatest threat to Poland in 2015."¹⁰ (Narkowicz 2018) It should be mentioned that Poland was greatly influenced by Hungary. Being surrounded by its conservative ideals, the people nonetheless opted for internal security and the fight against terrorism.

- "Closing doors is not the solution... We all have the duty of welcoming our brother who flees from war, hunger, or violence."¹¹ (Pope Francis 2016)
- "Our acts are primarily about Christian love... Gospel, not the Quran!"¹² (Jacek Międlar 2015)
- "I will be very clear. I do not see the possibility for migrants to come to Poland at this time"¹³ (Beata Szydło 2016)

Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Germany all provided varied responses. They've agreed to take in one more Syrian refugee. Germany established a scheme to welcome Syrian immigrants in March 2013. This initiative was significant since it gave Syrian refugees the ability to live there for an extended period. They stated that under this initiative, 20,000 of them will be accepted. The German chancellor suspended the Dublin Regulation in August 2015 for Syrians, allowing applications from Syrians arriving in Germany to be taken into consideration even if they had to travel through another European nation. This step made by Merkel, accelerated the flow of Syrian refugees across the Balkan corridor, but Hungary in this instance turned out to be a barrier for them. Germany found the simple answer—it just opened its borders and took in the migrants who were still in Hungary „The flow doubled in September moving from 9,800 in July to 11,220 in August to 18,085 in September. This is the effect of Germany's suspension of the Dublin Regulation on August 25. The peak of the flow was in October and November when the flow doubled from 18,085 in September to 30,215 in October, as the flow of Syrians to Germany increased in response to the Chancellor's welcoming remarks.¹⁴" (Ayoub 2019) Similarly, Sweden agreed to welcome migrants, and in 2015 it also made a commitment to absorb more refugees and renovate extra housing.

The two leading nations in Europe at the time were Germany and Great Britain, but their approaches to migrants turned out to be different. While the UK barely processed 3% (38,000) of asylum requests, Germany welcomed 30% (441,800) of its 1.2 million migrants. Why these states have disparate perspectives is the key question.

The UK does not impose a cap on the number of refugees, unlike Germany and Sweden. He established a scheme, in which migrants, who did not meet the criteria for refugee status, were given both humanitarian protection status and residency for a term of five years. Albeit this was not until 2015. The program for resettling Syrian refugees was rejected by Great Britain. The primary driver behind all of this was the nation's fear of its cultural variety, which was met with a language of public securitization. The creation of public opinion and the country's strategic culture both played important roles. Unlike Germany, the United Kingdom has deployed special security to defend itself from potential terrorist attacks and an economic catastrophe, as migrants may not be able to assimilate properly. Accord-

9 EduBirdie, writing platform. n.d. "EduBirdie." <https://www.simplypsychology.org/folk-devils-and-moral-panics-cohen-1972.html>.

10 Narkowicz, Kasia. 2018. May 22. <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10767-018-9287-9>.

11 Pope Francis. 2016.

12 Jacek Międlar, far-right priest,. 2015.

13 Beata Szydło, Prime Minister,. 2016.

14 Ayoub, Maysa Abbas. 2019. November 11. <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/REPS-03-2019-0024/full.pdf?title=understanding-germanys-response-to-the-2015-refugee-crisis>.

ing to 2016 poll, the majority of the British public supporters leaving the European Union, and Brexit was already executed in 2020, with one of the reasons being disagreement about refugees.

Conclusion

The Syrian conflict has offered many problems to the world. It posed a threat not just to the Middle East region, but also to the entire European continent. The Syrian civil war proved to be a watershed moment for European Union countries, which was a key moment for security and peace. The tensions resulted the diversity in viewpoints among its member nations, as well as revealed the weaknesses of the European Union. The Arab Spring and the civil conflict that followed in Syria spurred the EU to review and modify existing documents. As a result, sanctions were imposed on both military and economical spheres.

Despite the fact that the mentioned countries are all in the same geographical region - Europe - they have taken different approaches to the problem, leading to serious disagreements. Poland, Germany, Hungary, the United Kingdom, and other countries all had different perspectives on the conflict. They showed weakness at the most critical moment, when they should have been together and acted together. This fact exposed the European Union's weakness as an international organization. To some extent, distrust was developed between states, threatening Europe's overall security.

We believe that the paper is relevant and significant since there are still some differences in the indicated location. Europe may experience the same difficulties as it did in 2015. We attempted to illustrate in the study the primary factors, influencing Europe's security in general. In order to ensure security, European leaders must consider both risks and challenges posed by the Middle East area.

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EUROPEAN SECURITY AND CURRENT CHALLENGES

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Abstract

Security can be defined from a realist perspective as a product of power. The current international security environment is characterized by the effects of globalization and the increasing interdependence of international actors, consequently blurring the clear boundaries between military and non-military dimensions. European security, as a voluntary, responsible and conscious construct, is constantly and daily confronted with a system of internal and external challenges. By security challenge we mean all the factors of various kinds that can trigger security risks, dangers and threats to human society.

Global threats have not diminished, but changed. The danger of a major war in Europe has been replaced by a multitude of risk factors, the importance of which varies from region to region. Instability has spread throughout Europe. Conflicts have become explosive and a whole range of internal crises of a social, ethnic, religious, economic and even inter-state rivalry nature are unfolding. Security is a dynamic and active field, and in the 21st century it must cover all sectors of state and individual security, as well as ensure regional cooperation and interoperability with the EU structures

Keywords:

security, power, threats, war, crisis, society, globalisation.

Over the past decade, security in Europe has changed dramatically. While old threats have gradually disappeared, new and terrifying challenges have taken their place. This has led to a new perception of concepts such as security, conflict and peace. Today, the role of those involved in providing security is undergoing a fundamental process of change. New types of armed conflict and intensified relations between states have generated innovative solutions and a new way of thinking about the concept of security itself.

In the evolution of the process of achieving security, there has been an increase in recent years in efforts to build stability at European level, as an intermediate stage. The international community's efforts to establish peace in the Balkans, the Middle East and Africa are conclusive. The expansion of NATO's defence and security system by welcoming new members and the European Union's efforts to develop a continent-wide model for managing security dynamics have also been evident. In this context, the plethora of security problems that states have set out to address has led to an increase in the number and volume of international bodies. The results of their work have been relevant: dangers and threats have been reduced, although armed conflicts have not been eradicated.¹

Today's sources of security threat differ fundamentally from those at the end of the last millennium. The international community's discourse and action is continually adapting to new realities. The challenges are not only military conflicts between states, but are of a much more complex nature. Alongside the state actors, non-state and parastatal actors have emerged. The dangers, while latent, often escape our attention and can generate insecurity with serious consequences. Threats can thus no longer be analysed solely from a geographical perspective but primarily from a functional perspective. Since they are often trans-national in nature, they cannot be managed by a single country or a small group of countries.

Today's security environment, characterised by unprecedented globalisation, requires a comprehensive approach to all military, social, political and economic concepts. The dynamics of security strategies are constantly influenced by events with a major impact on the international environment and the way in which they have shaped the policies of the two main players in the world: the United States and the European Union. European security, as a voluntary, responsible and conscious construct, is constantly and daily confronted with a system of internal and external challenges.²

For European security, we look at them from their nature. This category includes economic, social, political, cultural and energy challenges. First of all, we opted for this grouping of internal security risks, dangers and threats because they are numerous, complex, dynamic, interdependent and constantly interacting. For example, economic challenges relate to human resources, natural resources, financial resources, quality of governance, economic policies at national and EU level, and measures to counter the negative effects of the global economic and financial crisis.

We analyse them in the light of the main phenomena with a significant impact on European security, including globalisation, the current economic and financial crisis, international migration, frozen conflicts, international terrorism and cross-border crime. We have chosen to address external security challenges through the prism of these phenomena as they play an important role in national, regional and international security.

At the same time, we make it clear that we see security challenges, whether internal or external, as having both positive and negative effects. Thus, globalisation generates both positive effects such as the promotion of new technologies, the development of intellectual assets, strategic foreign investment, the free movement of people, goods and capital, and undesirable consequences such as deregulation, relocation, unequal development of states, etc. Similarly, international migration, whether legal or illegal, has beneficial consequences, including economic development, the resolution of demographic problems, and unfavourable effects such as insecurity, delinquency and high crime, all of which have an impact on European security. It is up to the EU institutions and the national institutions of the Member States with competence in security matters to amplify the beneficial effects and to reduce or eliminate, if possible, the negative ones so that citizens can enjoy a climate of security, peace and calm, conducive to human life and activity.³

The subsystem of internal challenges and the subsystem of external challenges are in a continuous and constant interdependence and interaction and together they make up the system of current risks, dangers and threats to European security. For example, globalisation has a consistent and significant impact on the European and national economy, the social security of European citizens, economic, social and financial policies at Union and Member State level.⁴

1 Strategia europeană de securitate <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30815/qc7809568roc.pdf> accesat la 12.10.22, ora 10.09.

2 Fundamentele securității europene (regionale)

3 Fundamentele securității europene (regionale)

4 Politica europeană de securitate și apărare <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30815/qc7809568roc.pdf> accesat la 14.10.22, ora 16.05.

It designates a series of events occurring in the social or demographic field which, by their development, implications and effects, may pose risks to European security. The Union's current internal social challenges cannot be analysed in isolation from the economic ones. The impact of the economic and financial crisis on the social sphere is difficult to assess, despite the fact that its scale cannot be overlooked.

Strong effects of the crisis can be found, for example, in the area of labour market developments at European level. It is characterised by an unprecedented rise in unemployment, which implies major challenges for European social protection systems.

Unemployment is therefore one of the biggest challenges. To solve this problem, it is not only necessary to create new jobs, but also to ensure an optimal level of training of the population, to develop a sustainable education system and to create a culture of lifelong learning, which would help European citizens to acquire more skills and competences, increasing their adaptability to new jobs. From the above, another EU problem, exacerbated by the economic and financial crisis, emerges – education.⁵

Another internal EU problem is discrimination against ethnic minority groups. European countries continue to face difficulties in integrating Roma communities, identifying and implementing measures to eliminate discrimination, poverty and exclusion, even though they represent the largest minority population in the EU. The complexity of this problem is due to a combination of two factors. On the one hand, these minority groups show a certain resistance to efforts to integrate them into majority communities and, on the other hand, majority groups also have an attitude of rejection towards them. The security cost of not integrating Roma communities is proving to be increasingly high - not being included in the labour market, they contribute significantly to rising crime rates and intra-community tensions.⁶

The problem of minority groups is not only built around this community. It is closely linked to another defining phenomenon of the 21st century - migration. In the context of an ageing population and the urgent need for a young workforce to support economic development, migration can be both a contributing factor and a risk to security.

At the political level, the Union is facing a wide range of challenges, which are driven either by the global economic and financial crisis or by a context that precedes it.

These challenges consist of a set of politically motivated or politically occurring phenomena that have a number of consequences for European security or represent security risks.

The most obvious challenge is to find the right solutions to overcome the crisis. From a political point of view, the challenge for the EU to get out of this situation may be even greater than the crisis itself. This is because of the differences between the levels of economic development of the Member States, between the levels of economic growth since the economic events triggered by the collapse of the US housing market, between the levels of government indebtedness, etc. In addition, these differences tend to be amplified by contemporary economic turmoil. It is therefore difficult, if not utopian, to find a political solution at European level that can be applied to all the Member States, precisely because of these major discrepancies. The problem is all the more acute because most countries place national interests above European ones, which makes solidarity within the Union less and less effective and makes it difficult to reach a consensus on this issue.

As a complex and multidimensional phenomenon, globalisation has a significant impact on all human life and activity, both at the individual and community level.

In our view, there is a close link between globalisation, due to the increased multitude and diversity of its effects, and European security conceived as a concerted, conscious, voluntary and responsible construction of the EU states, its citizens and civil society organisations. Today, the European Union is a major player on the world stage. As a political, economic, demographic and other entity, the EU is deeply involved in and significantly influenced by globalisation. Thus, the European Union and its Member States are now confronted with an economic game in which the speed of adaptation of production systems has become even more crucial in order to maximise benefits, on the one hand, and to reduce the losses linked to integration into international trade, on the other hand.

The acceleration of the globalisation process seems to have led to the emergence of new challenges and opportunities which, on the one hand, demonstrate its impact on European security and, on the other hand, the need for the European Union to adapt its political, economic and social strategy flexibly to them.

5 Rata șomajului în Europa, <https://www.euractiv.ro/extern/rata-somajului-in-europa-la-un-nivel-istoric-scazut-3012> accesat la 22.10.22 ora 13.40

6 Tipuri de discriminare a romilor, <https://www.creeaza.com/referate/psihologie-psihiatrie/sociologie/Tipuri-de-discriminare-a-romil584.php> accesat la 22.10.22 ora 17.37.

The international crisis that has been manifesting itself in the US since 2007 has progressively spread to all the most developed countries on the planet. It has hit the real sector of industrialised economies, putting in difficulty certain activities (e.g. the car industry and real estate transactions) that have sustained economic growth in these countries over the years. The indirect effects of the crisis were immediately felt in the less developed countries and then the direct effects were quite severe for these countries.

In practical terms, the current economic and financial crisis is also having a significant impact on European security. In fact, it creates a number of security threats. In the short term, it is the instability of the most fragile states that could lead to internal unrest and international conflict.

The economic and financial crisis is adversely affecting European security both at the level of the EU as an economic, political, social and administrative entity and within each Member State. The factor generating insecurity is economic instability, which has negative effects on the social, political and economic activity of all EU Member States.

They are a permanent source of insecurity for the countries in the region. The war between Georgia and Abkhazia with Russian involvement is proof of this. In addition, some of these new states, unrecognised by the international community, have economic and commercial activities on their territory that are closer to the underworld than to the civilised world. In some of them, various terrorist organisations have training bases and/or a source of funding for their specific activities.

The existence of frozen conflicts has a multitude of security consequences. In our view, they all have only negative consequences for both the state affected by secession and the region in which they are located. The security of the European Union is significantly affected by frozen conflicts through the consequences they generate.

Thus, the existence of frozen conflicts in the EU's neighbouring states leads to population displacement, illegal migration and increased cross-border activity and crime. All this creates a permanent state of insecurity, unease and concern both in the 'breakaway republics' and in the EU Member States in the immediate vicinity of these self-proclaimed independent states. Hence, there is a need for the EU to take firm action both to strengthen its own security and to resolve these conflicts.

Challenges to European security, both internal and external, have both positive and negative effects. That is why the measures adopted by the EU institutions and Member States with security responsibilities are also geared towards enhancing the positive effects of some challenges on the one hand, and reducing or eliminating, as far as possible, undesirable consequences, on the other hand.

Sustainable development aims to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to respond adequately to their needs. It has three components - economic, social and environmental - which need to be taken into account in a balanced way at the political level. The European Union has established a long-term strategy to advise policies on economically, socially and environmentally sustainable development with the aim of improving the well-being and living conditions of present and future generations in a sustainable manner. This strategy sets a policy framework at EU level to enable sustainable development.

Sustainable development rests on four pillars: economic, social, environmental and international, which must be mutually reinforcing. The economic, social and environmental consequences of all policies must therefore be considered in a coordinated manner and taken into account when they are drawn up and adopted. The EU must also assume international responsibilities for sustainable development: these must be promoted beyond its borders, including issues of democracy, peace, security and freedom.

This strategy, which is complementary to the Lisbon Strategy, is intended to be a catalyst for public opinion and policy makers to influence behaviour in society. It focuses on measures covering the main challenges identified, cross-cutting measures, adequate funding, involvement of all stakeholders and effective implementation and monitoring of policies.

The interests of the European Union are first to protect its Member States, then to ensure stability at its borders and finally to improve the prosperity of the continent, i.e. the living conditions of its neighbours. The EU has all the social, political, economic and other means at its disposal to ensure its continued sustainable development and to become responsibly and meaningfully involved in resolving crises and conflicts in the world. Achieving such goals can only come about through the concerted and coherent efforts of its Member States.

The Common Security and Defence Policy is an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It provides the Union with an operational capability based on civilian and military means. The Union may use them in missions outside the Union to ensure peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The fulfilment of these tasks shall rely on capabilities

provided by Member States.

In other words, Member States maintain the specific character of their security and defence policy, respect their obligations to NATO, provide the EU with military and civilian capabilities to contribute effectively to the objectives set by the Council of the Union and, in the event of external military aggression by a Member State, the other Member States provide aid and assistance by all means.

Thus, the EU has been involved in the resolution of both frozen and non-frozen conflicts. For example, the Union is helping to resolve the Transnistrian conflict and the conflict between Russia and Georgia using diplomatic and economic rather than military means and instruments.

Terrorist acts are more destructive every day and the terrorist threat creates unprecedented dangers. In an increasingly interdependent world, no single country can effectively fight international terrorism alone. International terrorism is therefore a fundamental challenge for the international community. That is why, at both Community and national level, European states are flexibly adopting measures against international terrorism. As terrorism poses a threat to the security, freedom and values of the European Union and its citizens, EU action aims to provide an appropriate and tailored response to combat this phenomenon.

Prevention, protection, pursuit and response are thus the four axes of the global approach to international terrorism as a fundamental European security challenge. The EU will focus both on preventing and suppressing terrorist acts and on protecting infrastructures and citizens. The EU will also act with full force on the causes, means and capabilities of terrorism. At the same time, law enforcement and judicial coordination within the EU and international cooperation will be given increased attention by those in law as a condition for the effectiveness of the fight against this transnational phenomenon.

Reaction of the EU and its Member States towards international terrorism as a fundamental security threat is realistic. First and foremost, the risk of attacks cannot be totally eradicated. In the event of an attack, it is essential to: rapidly exchange practical information and decisions and ensure media coordination (this is a cross-border incident); ensure solidarity, assistance and compensation for victims of terrorism and their families at national and European level; provide assistance to the EU citizens in third countries; protect and support the civilian and military assets deployed in the EU in the event of crisis management operations.

In order to know the state of implementation of measures to combat international terrorism at Community level, every six months the European Council assesses the progress made in the fight against terrorism. A high-level political dialogue on the fight against terrorism must take place with each Presidency. It will be associated with the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament; the counter-terrorism strategy is complemented by an action plan containing concrete measures to be taken to prevent, protect, respond to and pursue terrorists. The Permanent Representatives Committee ensures systematic and detailed follow-up of progress in the fight against terrorism.

The European Union cooperates closely with NATO in the fight against international terrorism. In fact, for the Alliance the fight against terrorism is a priority and is part of its ongoing programme of activities. In practice, NATO offers the international community, and therefore the EU, a unique set of means to fight terrorism. First, the Alliance is a place of permanent consultation where debates lead to collective decisions. Second, it has unparalleled military capabilities. Finally, it is at the heart of a remarkable network of cooperation with a large number of partners.

Conclusions

The internal and external security challenges facing the EU and its Member States manifest themselves as a complex, dynamic and open system. They are complex, constantly expanding and interdependent. Their effects, favourable and unfavourable, are in practice cumulative and their consequences are wide-ranging. On the other hand, the Member States of the European Union are affected in different ways by the consequences of these effects, either positively or negatively. Their efforts will therefore have different intensities, natures and directions as well.

In order to counter the unintended consequences of security challenges, the European Union acts coherently and in a concerted manner both to amplify the positive effects and to mitigate and/or limit the effects of this system of security risks, dangers and threats. To this end, the necessary documents are adopted at the EU level to underpin the work of achieving European security, capable institutions are set up and the material, human and financial resources are provided for the successful completion of such a permanent mission.

The most important proposals emerging from the present chapters are: the EU solution to the current economic and financial crisis must be comprehensive and take into account all the factors that enter into the equation; to avoid creating large differences in the opportunities that each Member State offers its citizens, the EU should find a coordinated response at the EU level to the problem of social protection that is the need to harmonise Member States' security interests.

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NATO'S RESPONSE TO THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN WAR

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Abstract

The presented paper deals with NATO's efforts to effectively respond to the upcoming threats from the Russian Federation, which according to official sources pose the most significant and direct threat to the security of allies. Based on the peculiarities of the document, similar works have been considered and cited appropriately. More particularly, The paper discusses NATO's precautionary measures and combat readiness to protect the territory of the Allies, to preserve their sovereignty and territorial integrity in all areas and directions.

It encompasses challenges facing NATO today, its military response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, Response Force activation and its consequences and NATO's future vision along with their corresponding sub-topics. In addition, significant attention is paid to technological advancements to meet the demands of modern warfare and stay ahead of the competition in an increasingly connected and complex global security environment.

So, successfully implemented measures aimed at improving national and collective resilience under such circumstances would ensure reestablishment of international peace and stability.

Keywords:

NATO, Russo-Ukrainian War, NATO's response, NRF, international security

INTRODUCTION

In order to continue its existence, every geopolitical entity need to defend what it considers as its security interests. Any kind of modification or power shift in the sphere of countries' security, imposes a challenge to its existence and demands protection against it. As for Russian aggression, it stems from its legitimate security interests and the source for that is post-Cold War NATO expansion that severely affects Russia's sphere of influence. The relations went downhill after 1999 when Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary were invited to NATO.¹ Then, in 2004 – Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the three Baltic countries joined NATO and EU.² Eventually, in 2008, NATO decided to invite Georgia and Ukraine. For obvious geopolitical and geoeconomic reasons, these were the upper limit of Russian tolerance, which culminated in the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 and the Crisis of Crimea in 2014.

The Russo-Ukrainian war is an ongoing clash between two European countries and the world is witnessing its geopolitical consequences together with Europe, which is currently recalibrating its strategic concept to overcome today's security challenges. The relationship had become worse between NATO-Russia since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Since the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the future of the ex-Soviet countries became the pivotal point of rivalry between the West and Russia. Ukraine have been looking forward to integration into the EU and NATO, which became a new challenge for Russia. This gave a rise to questions, concerning NATO's new strategy: how it responds to recent challenges. As well as its future and technological advancements that define the outcomes of modern warfare.

NATO's recalibration of strategy

Since the NATO foundation in 1949, seven Strategic Concepts had been adopted.³ Four of these were created in the Cold War era – focusing on both defence and deterrence from the Soviet threat. Later, in 1991 and 1999, Strategic Concept documents were made public presenting a new vision for the Alliance altogether. Since then, the document focuses on a much broader definition of security.

The post-Cold War era openly ended when an all-out war had been unleashed by Russia against Ukraine. This sudden transition has challenged the bedrock of European values and principles, which later resulted in the upcoming shift of the European strategic landscape – NATO Strategic Concept 2022.

The assessment of global security landscape through the NATO Strategic Concept 2010 was overly optimistic and confident, which was the product of the era when Europe was enjoying its integrity and peace. At the time, the threat of a conventional attack on NATO territory was low, and a “genuine strategic partnership between NATO and Russia” was assumed. The upcoming Russo-Ukrainian war, coupled with US-China tension and the development of more sophisticated weaponry has moved Europe to recalibrate itself once again to overcome today's security challenges.

The new Strategic Concept of 2022 takes a radical stance, unlike its predecessor. It is based on an understanding that Europe ‘is not at peace’, which is directly tied to Russia's recent actions. The assault on Ukraine in 2022 has resulted in the Allies' call to focus extensively on both defence and deterrence. As an example, NATO's one of the pillars Germany has distributed another 100 billion Euros for its military budget,⁴ which greatly enhanced its value for NATO, especially after Germany announced that it was going to contribute 15,000-strong to NATO's Response Force by 2024.

Following the Russian aggression in Ukraine, NATO's eastern flank poses a critical concern to the allies. In this regard, NATO has taken steps to ensure the Allies' security. More precisely in Baltics and Poland 40,000 troops, namely ‘NATO's Response Force’, have been deployed, being under direct NATO command. After February 2022, the number of US troops in Europe increased to 100,000⁵. Besides, NATO plans to increase its response force up to 300,000⁶. In addition, at NATO Summit on 24 March, leaders agreed to set up multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria,

1 Perlez, Jane. “Poland, Hungary and the Czechs Join NATO.” The New York Times. The New York Times, March 13, 1999 <https://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/13/world/expanding-alliance-the-overview-poland-hungary-and-the-czechs-join-nato.html>.

2 States, Hon.Christopher H. SmithUnited. “Welcoming the Accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” CSCE, February 3, 2016. <https://www.csce.gov/international-impact-press-and-media/statements/welcoming-accession-bulgaria-estonia-latvia>.

3 Nato. “Strategic Concepts.” NATO, June 29, 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm.

4 Valasek, T. (2022) “NATO's political and security adaptation in response to Russia's war: Assessing the new strategic concept and implementation of the Madrid summit decisions.” NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

5 Kaufman, Ellie, and Barbara Starr. “US Likely to Keep 100,000 Troops in Europe for Foreseeable Future in Face of Russian Threat, US Officials Say | CNN Politics.” CNN. Cable News Network, May 20, 2022. <https://edition.cnn.com/2022/05/20/politics/us-troops-in-europe/index.html>.

6 “NATO Plans Huge Upgrade of Rapid Reaction Force in ‘Era of Strategic Competition’.” France 24, June 27, 2022. <https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220627-nato-plans-huge-upgrade-of-rapid-reaction-force-in-era-of-strategic-competition>.

Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. The battlegroup was set up in response to a clear threat from Russia.

Challenges facing NATO

Since 2014 NATO has taken military measures intended to reassure the Allies' security. A new policy had been adopted, positioning Russia, along with terrorism and PRC as a clear threat to European freedom and peace. Nonetheless, given NATO's earlier unwillingness to confront Russia, its reorientation in 2014 was unprecedented for its polarity and decisiveness, leading to NATO's shift towards collective defence in response to the destabilization of a non-member - Ukraine

Consequently, both the US and Russia are encouraged to escalate the tension in Ukraine for their own strategic gains. As a result, snowballing Ukraine crisis will shift NATO's calculation in its regional interests.

For Western European countries, large-scale war in Ukraine caused a refugee crisis. Due to increasing security challenges, Europe must rely on US security protection under NATO. The crisis therefore gave the US enormous leverage over its European allies. Europe's close alignment with the national interests of the United States has caused the People's Republic of China (PRC) to be seen as a threat, as outlined in NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept.

NATO's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine

As a result of poor training, poor morale, shortage in key equipment and corruption in police as well as in the military, Ukraine's armed forces and police were unable to effectively oppose Russian aggression back in 2014⁷, when Crimea was annexed. Since then, NATO members have agreed to strengthen their cooperation in every direction with the government of Ukraine, and according to "NATO-Russia relations-A Snapshot" by Raynell Andreychuk, Russia is "too big to ignore",⁸ therefore, modernizing and strengthening the military, as well as defence and deterrence capabilities are part of NATO's response to Russian aggression. All of the above-mentioned efforts include providing military instructors to Ukrainian armed forces, together with improving interoperability and modernization in mind.

In three weeks in 2022, NATO held three meetings where leaders condemned the invasion in the strongest terms.⁹ They demanded a ceasefire from Russia and immediate withdrawal of all its forces from Ukraine and called on Russia to engage in peaceful negotiations. In defence NATO has enhanced its eastern flanks of the Alliance territory with great deployment of troops and equipment. It is also worth mentioning, that as NATO is not seeking war with Russia, neither will it deploy forces in a non-member state - Ukraine, nor will it enforce a no-fly zone over Ukraine. The decision above stems from NATO's emphasis on its role as a defensive alliance.

Nevertheless, NATO does not restrict its members from individually supplying weapons and equipment to Ukraine. In addition to the unprecedented sanctions organized within the framework of NATO, allies such as Great Britain, the United States, Canada and several European Union member states have provided equipment and weapons to Ukraine. Within the scope of NATO's framework, the organization assists allies in providing humanitarian and non-lethal assistance.¹⁰

Concerning organizational security, as mentioned in the Madrid Summit of 2022, NATO Allies are 'confronted by cyber, space, and hybrid and other asymmetric threats, and by the malicious use of emerging and disruptive technologies'.¹¹ Several announcements were made at the summit, including the development of a defence innovation accelerator and the launch of a multinational innovation fund that brings together legal entities to promote technological development.

It's also worth mentioning, that NATO had already decided to strengthen its deterrence measures in the east in 2014 and its forward presence in 2016, which ultimately led to the activation of a response force.

7 Collins, Liam. "In 2014, the 'Decrepit' Ukrainian Army Hit the Refresh Button. Eight Years Later, It's Paying Off." The Conversation, October 6, 2022. <https://theconversation.com/in-2014-the-decrepit-ukrainian-army-hit-the-refresh-button-eight-years-later-its-paying-off-177881>.

8 Andreychuk, R. (2019) "NATO-Russia Relations – A Snapshot." Political Committee.

9 Nato. "Statement by NATO Heads of State and Government (Brussels 2022)." NATO, March 24, 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_193719.htm?selectedLocale=en.

10 Clapp, S. (2022) "Russia's war on Ukraine: NATO response." European Parliament.

11 Madrid Summit Declaration issued by NATO heads of state and government (2022) NATO https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm?selectedLocale=en

Following the plenary session on March 1, the European Parliament called on the member states to increase the defence budget, develop more effective capabilities and to fully exploit the EU's joint potential to strengthen collective defence capabilities, aimed at enhancing NATO and EU security.

In addition, significant attention is paid to the advancement of cyber capabilities. The cyber component not only supplies the military with a rich source of data for intelligence and surveillance, but also provides non-lethal and lethal means. Which aims at effectively delivering attacks on the enemy through disabling vehicles or shutting down electric systems. All of the above is done remotely, which reduces the physical involvement in an operation.

NATO's Response Force and what does its activation mean

According to the NATO website, The NATO Response Force – NRF is a 'ready to launch', a technologically advanced multinational force made up of land, air, maritime and Special Operations Forces elements, that the Alliance can deploy anywhere in no time.¹² As General James Jones put it, "NATO will no longer have the large, massed units that were necessary for the Cold War, but will have agile and capable forces at Graduated Readiness levels that will better prepare the Alliance to meet any threat that it is likely to face in this 21st century."¹³ In response to Russian threat, NRF has been deployed on the Eastern flanks of Europe for the first time. Along with the troops, armored vehicles, artillery units, nearly 130 allied fighter jets and 140 allied ships were deployed in the region.¹⁴

The 40,000-strong force was formed to quickly address number of scenarios ranging from environmental problems to protecting territorial integrity. Hence, the intention, of course, is not to send troops to Ukraine itself, but to ensure NATO's security at the border between Ukraine and NATO member states. This emphasizes the solidarity, determination and ability of allies to defend their territory and people.

Activation of NRF was the outcome of multiple factors including, but not limited to, Moscow's direct warning to Finland and Sweden against joining NATO. The latter countries are part of the EU, if not NATO, and the EU has a similar mutual-defence agreement. Therefore, if an EU member state is attacked, the rest are there to help.

In terms of civilian participation, the creation of NATO civilian response force had been proposed to reduce the pressure of non-military tasks from the troops. Such aid could come in handy for humanitarian or logistic missions. Given the extent to which ordinary people are participating in the Russia-Ukraine war, such an initiative would significantly increase NATO's flexibility and effectiveness.

NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept

Modern battlefield is fluid, complex and everchanging. Both innovative technologies and their capabilities are turning science fiction into reality. Autonomous weaponry is changing the face of the battlefield, and it is coming to a point, where it will eventually challenge both current ethical and legal laws of war. In addition, losing control of satellites and airspace will cripple Alliances' overall capabilities. All of the aforementioned led to NATO's Artificial Intelligence strategy in 2021¹⁵, the creation of the Defence Innovation Accelerator¹⁶ of the North Atlantic (DIANA) and the launch of the NATO Innovation Fund.

Fortunately, NATO already has the means to effectively operate in every possible scenario. It has AWACS, an airborne early warning and control aircraft, Joint Force Air Component (JFAC), Multinational Brigades, Force Integration Units, NRF, and Standing Naval Forces (SNFs).

The NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC) is developed to ensure proper protection of the Alliance's security interests in the future. NWCC argues, that even though the fundamental nature of war does not change, the traditional understanding of war is no longer suitable for modern warfare. Instead of a binary approach (as in war/peace, victory/defeat, red/blue), the Alliance needs to see future conflicts holistically. There is a multitude of other underlying factors to ensuring security, such as cultural, political, economic, social, and industrial, affecting both the process and outcome of a war. Due to these factors, along with technological advancements, tomorrow's conflicts will be characterized by the widening of the battlespace even more, which will not be limited only to mil-

12 Nato. "NATO Response Force." NATO, February 25, 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm.

13 NATO response force (2022) NATO. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm

14 Valasek, T. (2022) "NATO's political and security adaptation in response to Russia's war: Assessing the new strategic concept and implementation of the Madrid summit decisions." NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

15 Christie, Edward Hunter, and Zoe Stanley-Lockman. "An Artificial Intelligence Strategy for NATO." NATO Review, October 25, 2021. <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/10/25/an-artificial-intelligence-strategy-for-nato/index.html>.

16 Lunga, Chiedza. "Diana - NATO's New Defence Innovation Accelerator." ADS Group, September 28, 2021. <https://www.adsgroup.org.uk/blog/diana-natos-new-defence-innovation-accelerator/>.

itary campaigns.

Basically, NWCC relies on five imperatives, that will ensure the Alliance's security.

- Cognitive Superiority – this is advocated because it ensures the ability to adapt, and expansion of knowledge given a set of problems. This imperative is crucial to win wars, considering, it ensures intellectual excellence, diversity, and free flow of ideas in the Alliance. Such superiority requires nurturing education, critical thinking and the human factor in general. It relies on the ability to learn not only from our own mistakes but also from the mistakes of others.
- Integrated Multi-Domain Defence – this concept revolves around the idea, that the Alliance needs to delegate authority across all domains of command. The importance of independent judgement and mutual trust between operators at all levels of war cannot be stressed enough.
- Influence and Power Projection – in future warfare, multinational military exercises and joint military operations won't be enough for both influence and power projection. It proposes an idea, that hard power capabilities need to be complemented with soft power projection, which relies on the assessment of the audience, understanding of human psychology and calibrated targeting, eventually leading to reaching those NATO wants to influence.
- Cross-Domain Command – this is basically saying that commanders must be able to operate in a complex and dynamic combat environment, both mentally and physically. The demand stemmed from the fact, that the commanders have to deal with many non-military tasks and non-military organizations that require taking into consideration a multitude of factors.
- Layered Resilience – it stresses the idea, that the alliance must be ready for difficult situations for a long period of time and ready from day one. For this reason, the NWCC needs to construct "layered resilience" consisting of military resilience, military-civil resilience, and civil resilience.¹⁷

Although the NWCC is a great framework for NATO's future security, real resources need to be acquired to enable the development of "five imperatives". Setting a clear plan is great, but if the plan has no real means of achieving it, then it is destined for failure, obviously. Therefore, the Alliance needs to implement these ideas into the real world, which is full of complexity and competition.

CONCLUSION

Delivering an adequate response to international conflicts at own border is quite complicated as it is and in light of this, it is even harder to ensure integrity and security in a multinational organization, like NATO. The Alliance has seen the difficulties it faces today and has thankfully begun to revise its strategic objectives to fit a wider range of issues coming in the future. But of course, little can be asserted with any degree of certainty, so careful examination of own's actions and deployment of the right analytical assumptions is necessary. The impact of an intensified Ukraine crisis forced the Alliance to look deeply into both improving interoperability and security, which eventually led to revising core strategic concepts, as well as development of the NWCC and NRF activation. The paper shows, that collective efforts make difference on a grand scale.

As the world gets increasingly competitive in every way, fast adaptation to unfamiliar problems becomes more crucial than ever. As already said, the Alliance needs to see future conflicts holistically. Due to a multitude of factors, along with technological advancements, tomorrow's conflicts will be characterized by the expansion of the battlespace even more.

Naturally, counter-response from opposing forces is expected. Given the tension between US-China, it will not be a surprise to see both Russia and China working collectively to compete accordingly. Since the NATO Strategic Concept 2022 directly positions Russia as "the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security and to peace and stability", it is expected that the events will escalate even more.

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OPERATIONAL RESERVES AS A GUARANTOR TO SUSTAIN AND INCREASE THE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMED FORCES IN JOINT OPERATION

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Abstract

In the contemporary world, the thin line between peace and war is increasingly less clear than at any time in modern history. Due to the wide range of threats, from covert aggression, terrorism and subversion to open intimidation, to the use of brute force, the defence is a fundamental type of state activity through which national security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence are guaranteed. It ensures the process of generation and maintenance of the necessary operational capabilities for maintaining a stable security environment. The basis of the operational capabilities is the military instrument of the national power, represented by the Armed Forces. Armed Forces have to be prepared to meet, response to and neutralize the risks and ranging in intensity military threats at any moment.

Carrying out the defence of the country as a part of collective defence with NATO allies, as well as the framework of the European security and defence policy, the Armed Forces of the country adopt Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty to self-defence and protect an eventually attacked ally. These actions might be undertaken individually or collectively within an allied joint operation.

Armed Forces are conducting joint operation by covering and defending a threatened section of the state border, protecting the air and sea spaces of the country and generating acceptable conditions for the allied forces deployment in order to conduct allied operations to resolve the conflict. One of the main objectives of each joint operation and challenge for the commanders is maintaining low level of risk for the troops, which is organic task for the operational reserves.

The main purpose of the operational reserves of the armed forces is to build a deterrent and defensive effect and regain the initiative within the military operation that could be guaranteed by maintaining a certain amount of unengaged forces and assets in order to reinforce, restore or replace once engaged troops, growing up the efforts or developing a gained success in a certain theatre of operations.

Keywords:

Armed Forces, capabilities, collective defence, joint operation, operational reserves.

Introduction

In contemporary world, the thin line between peace and war is increasingly less clear than at any time in modern history. Due to the wide range of threats, from covert aggression, terrorism, subversion, and open intimidation to the use of brute force, defence is a fundamental type of state activity through which national security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence are guaranteed. It provides the process of generating and maintaining the necessary operational capabilities to maintain a stable security environment.

The basis of the country's operational capabilities is the military instrument of national power, represented by the armed forces, which must be prepared to meet, react to and neutralize risks and military threats varying in intensity at any moment.

The armed forces formed by the state are military and specialized formations and their associations, subject to a specific organization and order of functioning, which possess and use military and special means of action to ensure the goals of the defence¹ of the country. They are used in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, the laws of the country and international law, as the "National Defence Strategy" that defines the three missions of the armed forces: "Defence", "Support for International Peace and Security" and "Contribution to National Security in Peacetime"².

Main part

The armed forces develop and maintain capabilities to protect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the country in accordance with the formulated missions arising from the nature of potential sources of tension related to international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the instability of democratic processes in conflict regions, organized crime, illegal trafficking of strategic raw materials, technology, weapons, drugs and people, economic instability, environmental disasters, natural disasters and accidents³.

Under the "Defence" mission, the Armed Forces build and develop capabilities for the defence of the country independently and in the system of collective defence in allied operations; they participate in a collective defence operation outside the country, with previously announced and prepared forces.

The Air Force and the Navy continuously fulfill the commitments regarding the protection of the water area and the airspace on the eastern flank of the Alliance, independently and jointly with the NATO partners.

Under the mission "Support for International Peace and Security", the Armed Forces maintain readiness and participate with contingents and formations in operations in response to a crisis to support international peace and security outside the country; they participate in arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, confidence and security building measures.

Under the mission "Contribution to National Security in Peacetime" with the built-in capabilities, the Armed Forces assist the central and territorial bodies of the executive power and local government bodies in the preparation, maintenance and protection of the population, the national economy and infrastructure in crisis management and overcoming their consequences. They assist the security authorities in guarding the state border, other strategic objects in the fight against illegal migration and in the fight against terrorism.

Carrying out the defence of the country in the context of collective defence with NATO allies and within the framework of the European security and defence policy, the Armed Forces maintain capabilities to prevent and deter possible threats jointly and in coordination with NATO forces and/or from member states of The European Union, under the conditions and according to the procedure described in Article 3 and Article 5 of the "North Atlantic Treaty" Agreement.

This treaty expresses NATO's ability to deter threats coming from various directions such as tensions from the threat of the use of military force, growing terrorist threats and/or migration challenges. These capabilities are represented by the "360 Degree Approach"⁴ Concept to resolve threats and protect allies against any adversary. The comprehensive approach is adapted to the "360-degree approach" concept and is applied at all levels of management.

The political and strategic levels are expressed in building trust and understanding between the participating actors. At the operational level, the problems related to civil-military cooperation and interaction with national and international actors in the planning and conduct of allied joint operations are being solved. At the operational level,

1 Law on Defence and Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria – Sofia, 2021, p. 16.

2 National Defence Strategy – Sofia, 2016, p. 11.

3 Program 2032 for Development of the Defence Capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria – Sofia, 2021, p.14.

4 "NATO 360 Approach" is described in detail within Sabine Lösing work "360° NATO: Mobilization on all fronts"- Information on Politics and Society No. 12, April 2017, News, Reports and Analyses from the European Parliament. Edited by Sabine Lösing, MEP.

as per AJP-1, in an allied format, large-scale operations are conducted to achieve strategic objectives in theaters of operations and the operational level is the link between strategic objectives and the tactical military activity.

In the event of a military-political crisis developing into a conflict of high or medium intensity, at the initiative of the affected party, and according to Article 4 of the Washington Treaty, the North Atlantic Council activated consultations to undertake diplomatic initiatives to prevent the conflict. The North Atlantic Council could pre-emptively deploy part of the NATO Response Force to the joint area of operation.

The armed forces can participate in an allied joint defence operation by covering and protecting a threatened section of the state border, protecting the air and sea space of the country and creating acceptable conditions for the deployment of allied forces in order to conduct allied operations to resolve the conflict.

In this scenario, fulfilling Article 3 of Washington Treaty, the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria and army doctrines, the Armed Forces are brought from state of peace to state of war and a full strategic deployment of forces is carried out⁵. The armed forces are deployed within a defined area of joint operations of the threatened theater of operations, in accordance with military-political and strategic objectives, forming the defence battle group to increase the presence of the threatened theatre of operations and to use force adequate to the military threat within the joint operation.

The concept of conducting an allied defence operation at the operational level is the tactical success in the various domains and areas of operations to be combined for creating the desired effects to achieve NATO's desired end state while respecting the fundamental principles of defence.⁶

The concept must be sustainable and active - it could mislead the enemy about its real formation, conduct maneuver with forces, means and fire to achieve surprise and hold the initiative throughout all phases of the operation and maintain a low level of risk for the troops. This could be achieved by understanding the strategic context and desired outcomes and by effectively deploying forces and resources where necessary and scaling up the main efforts when and where necessary in coordination with other actors, which is an organic task for operational reserves.

The main purpose of the operational reserves of the armed forces is to build a deterrent and defensive effect in order to regain the initiative within the military operation, which can be ensured by maintaining a certain amount of uncommitted forces and assets in order to reinforce, restore or replace once engaged troops, to increase the efforts and develop the success achieved in a particular area of operation.

The reserve is the commander's main asset of reducing the risk in combat, since its tasks are organically related to the execution of tasks that could arise in the course of combat. To keep the level of risk low, commanders must set aside a certain amount of forces and assets that, after use, must be restored or replaced. Commanders are using their operational reserves to exploit the enemy's weak points and counterattack an exposed flanks and vulnerable units to defeat, or to deny the enemy from maintaining control of critical terrain or an object in order to retake the initiative.

Determining the size, composition, and mission of the operational reserves as early as possible, relative to what risk is acceptable is essential for the success of the operation. A reserve is an unused force, at least until hostilities begin, and its primary purpose is to preserve the commander's freedom of action in the course of hostilities from unforeseen circumstances to counter unexpected enemy action. The reserve could be activated in case of certain circumstances, therefore it is necessary for the commanders to have certain criteria for when, where, why and how he will use his reserve in order to ensure its engagement timely. These criteria should and will be updated during the combat, as the situation evolves and the enemy's intentions become more apparent, because in certain moment the reserve actions could become the primary effort of the whole battle group. To help the forces fix and canalize the enemy into a planned area of the battlefield where it can be surrounded, isolated and destroyed, the main tasks⁶ assigned to the operational reserves within the allied joint defensive operation could be:

- Blocking. Containment of the enemy in the area where insufficient forces were previously deployed;
- Counterattacks or quick slashing attacks. They will usually have limited objectives. It may be necessary to use reserves to counterattack in certain areas to achieve withdrawal of the engaged forces;
- Cover-up actions. Reserves can also be used in prepared positions to cover the withdrawing forces.
- Relief in place of forces in order to restore forces within certain decisive point or operation phase.

⁵ Guideline for Planning Operations – Part I – Strategic Level (TP 5.1) – Sofia, 2013., p. 60.

⁶ Doctrine for Land Operations (NP-3.2, EDITION A) – Sofia, 2020, p. 9.

6 Operational reserves main tasks are summarized from a different source, as followed:

- Field Manual for a Division, Regiment and Brigade – National Publication;
- Field Manual 3-90-1 Offense and Defence, Volume I – USAF, 2013;

- Regain the initiative, increase the efforts and exploit the success once achieved.

The concept of exploitation of the reserve is when the enemy is starting to breach the main line of defence. In order to hold it, the battle group is conducting maneuver with forces and assets from the non-threatened directions to consolidate the defence on the threatened area. In the event that the resulting ratio of forces and means is unfavorable for allied forces, efforts should be concentrated on holding the second line of defence and securing a line for conducting a counterattack by the designated group. Artillery and aviation assets should provide fire and air support in the interest of the defending formations with particular attention to the enemy's avenues of breaching. The main objective is to stop the enemy at the borderline and to create conditions for pushing out or destroying the entrenched enemy group and restoring the integrity of the defence and the state border.

The concept of a counterattack is to determine the necessary forces and means, the time, the areas for concentration and preparation for carrying out the counterattack, the method and sequence of defeating the enemy, according to his state, position and intention of actions. Time as a quantity is critical to counterattacks, but the commander may have little latitude in determining with certainty when to use the reserve. Commanders must anticipate upcoming actions and the need to deploy their reserves into different areas to ensure that when committed, they will arrive at the right place, time, and in the right order of formation and assets to fight properly for executing their intent to regain initiative. Commanders must accurately estimate the location, timing, and distance of subsequent enemy echelons and plan how, when, and where to use their reserves in local counterattacks, because if committed prematurely, the reserve may not be available for more dangerous contingencies and be unnecessarily exposed to enemy action. If it commits too late - it may not arrive on time.

The relief in place of the troops is an organized reception and handover by the formations of the occupied areas, lanes and positions, which includes the activities of their handover, including information about the enemy, the organization of the fires, the engineering of the battlefield, the organization of the command and control, communications and monitoring of the battlefield, epidemiological and biological situation of the area, as well as all the necessary data concerning the troops, air support and air defence.

Actual relief in place of the troops on the ground could be carried out by different actions as followed: on the spot in the occupied formation area or by passing through the formation battle order of entrenched troops.

In case of exploitation of success in depth, the main forces are rapidly developing their success, simultaneously with the frontal attack, bypassing and attacking the flanks of the halted or retreating group of the enemy. Artillery and aviation groups should provide fire support and close air support for the maneuvering group. Maintaining the high rates of advance is achieved by sequentially bringing the reserves into battle from pre-planned lanes of the direction of the strikes. Commanders should introduce and exploit the operational reserves in the direction where the greatest success has been achieved.

Conclusion

From all above, it could be concluded that the operational reserves are the main asset of the commanders to reduce the risk in combat. If located when and where they are most capable of reacting when necessary, they are the guarantor of maintaining and enhancing the operational capabilities of the armed forces in a joint operation to protect sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the country.

Therefore, the armed forces must commit and maintain a certain amount of forces and assets to impose, restore or replace the forces once engaged in order to regain the initiative, increase the efforts in a certain area of the battlefield, and to exploit the success achieved within the certain line of operation.

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RUSSIA' FOREIGN POLICY AND INFLUENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

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Abstract

The role of powerful countries in international relations is the most considerable, because they are the main actors, who change global processes and balance of power all over the world. In this work, we will talk about world's one of the biggest and powerful country – Russia and its influence and impact on Europe. Nowadays, this issue has taken a special place, because of Ukraine crisis. Started with the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, followed by new war in 2022, which is still in progress. Throughout this events, Russia has destroyed key elements of security system in Europe. A new geopolitical architecture of Europe has started to build up as well. To understand Russia's actions, it's important to acquire a knowledge of its history, political guidance and ideology. Russia has received special attention as an Eurasian country that has played a decisive role in the development of the former Soviet bloc. We argue here, that the question of Russian development under Putin's leadership, raises specific security questions and may affect the entire post-Soviet space and European security architecture. The purpose of this paper is first, to examine geopolitics as a contributing perspective to this topic, and second, to shed light on the Russia's foreign policy. Finally, we assess how Russia's strategic approach complements its prescriptive perspective in understanding current challenges.

Keywords:

cold war, foreign policy, Soviet bloc, security system, Ukraine crisis, sanctions.

Main aspects of Russia's foreign policy

Scientists and experts have divided the nations that make up this "space" into various categories since the end of the Cold War, both after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, describing the internal and external orientation of each nation.¹ As a country in Eurasia, the Russian Federation draws special attention and aspires to play a significant role in the development of the former Soviet bloc.² The most significant successor state to the former Soviet Union, Moscow, is a strategic player. Understanding the new position of the former superpower in Europe requires an understanding of Russian geopolitics, especially when considering the analysis of Russia's abundant natural resources and conventional and nuclear weapons.³

The fact that Russia's political class has an imperial mindset, particularly toward its smaller neighbors in central Eurasia (as evidenced by the war in Georgia in August 2008),⁴ is nothing new to us. According to Marcel van Herpen, the early era is where this mentality originated. "The colonization of neighboring territories and the enslavement of neighboring peoples is a continuous process for Russia,"⁵ the author writes. It's almost as if this is a component of Russia's genetic make-up. Despite centuries of regime change, Russia's imperialist core has not changed.

Sergei Soloviev, a historian from Russia, provided the following justification for such a policy: "Russia is a huge continental state, unprotected by natural borders and open to the east, south, and west. It was destined to suffer through protracted wars from the start. A poor nation dispersed over vast areas needed to be constantly prepared to mobilize forces to defend itself.

Despite the pressure from all sides coming from other states or ideologies. An enormous army had to be kept on hand at all times in a poor, agricultural nation. According to a different Russian historian, the Russian state's needs for defence and security have always taken precedence over all others. The inviolability of the territory and the security issues came first, and all other requirements for the growth of the country and the nation came in second. This in itself required a strong enough government to oppress the populace, keep a sizable army in place, and keep people from fleeing the oppressive regime. Instead of the factors essential for the development of the state, such violence brought political development and the desire for hegemony to the fore.

Additionally, as we all know, Russia has never had an economy that strong that it could only have a limited impact on the rest of the world at this point in time and throughout its history. Because of this, this state has decided to conceal its weaknesses by pursuing a continuous policy of expansionism and exerting its own influence through both soft and hard forces. It is simple to strengthen both Russian ideologies and pressures in fragile society, particularly in the post-Soviet states where there is ongoing unrest. Russia tries to do this in a number of ways, including through the media, social networks, various soft power tools, and of course brute (military) power, which is an important factor for the Russian Federation.⁶ Due to its foreign-political situation, Russia became a military complex that it was able to maintain for many centuries, with a militaristic mindset and a significant amount of coercive power. We also want to draw attention to a related social type where power completely dominates all other factors.

It is clear from its military doctrine and the order it issued regarding the use of the atomic bomb that Russia places a high priority on military development.⁷

"The military doctrine of the Russian Federation is one of the key strategic planning documents in the Russian federation and constitutes a system of the views officially adopted in the state on preparations for armed defence and on the armed protection of the Russian federation,"⁸ according to the website.

In 2010, Russia actively used military force to extend its political influence throughout the international system, according to Russian military doctrine. Additionally, the nation's borders must be protected. It's also important to note that Russia defends and views the use of force against its own population as necessary to protect both those inside and outside the nation.

Because of this seemingly unimportant article, Russia was able to invade Ukraine and may do so again in the future to "protect its own population."⁹

As we can see, Russia's foreign and domestic policies are heavily influenced by military might, and this is

1 https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/CWIHPBulletin12-13_p1.pdf

2 <https://journals.openedition.org/eces/1568>

3 <https://journals.openedition.org/eces/1568>

4 <https://academic.oup.com/book/40852/chapter-abstract/348888158?redirectedFrom=fulltext>

5 https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/iarj/iarj_02_04b.html

6 <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23745118.2018.1545181>

7 <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7329278/>

8 https://carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf

9 <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7329278/>

supported by the fact that, since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has engaged in dozens of wars with its neighbors, winning nearly all of them (apart from the first conflict in Chechnya). This fact amply proves that Russia is overly reliant on military might and expansionism.

It is challenging to avoid mentioning the Soviet era when discussing the development of Russian politics and ideologies. After the Russian Revolution and the rise of the Bolsheviks, they consolidated too much power, which gave rise to inflated self-images. They see themselves as people whose primary mission was to fundamentally alter history and alter the course of the world. The communist system attempted to encircle the entire world during the global revolution. Violence engulfed both the nation's internal and external systems during this time. Due to this evolution, Russia's current foreign policy—which primarily favors an aggressive and radical approach toward its neighbors—was developed. Russians were psychologically influenced by the Soviet Union's extraordinary power and hegemony in the world and were led to believe that they would continue to hold hegemonic power after the Soviet Union's demise. But given the current circumstances, we can say that this is a false illusion that has been ingrained in the minds of a society that has been enmeshed in a single system for a long time.

Russia, which opposes the West, is one of the most dangerous nations, as we all know. In international politics, the nation is a steadfast defender of conservative principles and an outspoken opponent of liberal ones. From this vantage point, Russia is attempting to erode both the internal and external pillars of the liberal international order.¹⁰

According to academics, among many other factors, Russia's foreign policy is influenced by a strong belief that the West has made an effort to criticize and disregard it ever since the Cold War. Since Russia was decades behind the rest of the world in development after the fall of the Soviet Union, it appears as though they did not view Russia as a force to be reckoned with. However, as a result of the West's strategy, Russia has adopted a policy that is anti-liberal or anti-Western. The Moscow leadership asserts that the West has continued to spread liberal ideologies along Russia's borders while ignoring Russia's crucial interests. This is supplemented by the fact that Europe backs the US on a number of crucial issues, particularly in regards to NATO expansion and the creation of a new security architecture, which the Russian authorities claim threatens their nation.¹¹ The Russian people's and the government's stance on the West's expansion has roots in their past. As you may know, the Mongols occupied Russia for two centuries before they were driven out. They gave the Russians a system of state administration during this time, and the Russians also developed a complex psychological condition characterized by both insecurity and a willingness to give up everything in the name of independence and sovereignty.

In any case, the main outcome of this process is that Russia and the West are locked in a perpetual conflict. This is because a democratic Europe that wants to uphold its ideals cannot coexist with Putin's regime, which is conservative and territorially ambitious.¹² Moscow wants to destroy liberal democracy because it sees it as a threat. Therefore, it frequently tries to control and sway the areas close to its borders in order to stop its neighbors from implementing opposing policies because, in their eyes, doing so directly threatens the country's ability to live in peace.¹³

Change of European security architecture

The invasion of Ukraine by Putin in early April, according to British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, “shatters the very foundation of our continent's security. The Europe we knew just six weeks ago no longer exists.”¹⁴ The Prime Minister's statement demonstrated that the fundamentals of European security are currently being revised, a lengthy and in-depth process. Politicians in Europe have long held the view that without Russia, peace in Europe is impossible.¹⁵ The Congress of Vienna first proposed this idea in 1815, which laid the groundwork for the creation of pan-European security following the fall of Napoleon's empire. Its central concept was a “Concert of Europe” built on a “conflictual balance” between the “great European powers,” including Russia.¹⁶

Later, in 1951, Paris saw the establishment of a different and significantly more secure European security system. The establishment of one of the strongest political and economic European unions in the future was made possible by the creation of the European Union of Coal and Steel. Economic interdependence has taken the place of the previous equilibrium in this system that depended on conflict and military might. Due to their close ties, this led to a situation where it was impossible for the member states to consider starting the war. It should be noted that the new European security system did not include Russia (USSR). Politicians invited Russia to join the new system for the

10 https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/CWIHPBulletin12-13_p1.pdf

11 <https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/russia-and-security-of-europe-pub-63990>

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16 <https://ukraineworld.org/articles/opinions/russia-and-european-security>

first time in 1991, following the fall of the Soviet Union. Thus, after 1991, a relationship of interdependence between the European Union and its eastern neighbors—primarily Russia—emerged. As a result, Russia experienced political, economic, and social changes following the Cold War that were in line with Western action plans, ideologies, and values. A multi-party electoral system was implemented, and the economy was privatized and liberalized as part of the new Russian reforms. Thus, the nation started to emerge from the Soviet era's economic stagnation. Due to these circumstances, Europe had the chance to establish contact with Russia. PCAs and other agreements were signed at that time and have been crucial to this initial period. They helped to support other aspects of Russia's transformation, such as the development of the civil society, infrastructure investments, and institutional and market reforms.

But after 1991, the Russian ruling class quickly realized that the new European security system did not ensure Russia's own security; on the contrary, the spread of Western liberalism was poisonous to the Russian state. This was brought about by the fact that, despite the Soviet Union's demise, Russia's policy remained imperial in nature and it did not change fundamentally. Later, Russia also criticized European liberalism and ultimately rejected this system. The main reason was that Russia lost its hegemonic position in the world. With the fall of the USSR, all aspirations and hopes for Russian hegemony in the world were dashed. Along with Belarus and Ukraine, the Baltic States were lost to the nation; these three countries served as the main platforms for Russian political influence. As a result, Russian despotism spread throughout the nation and new political ideologies emerged. The nation has chosen aggressive strategies to increase its influence in nearby nations.

The decline in Western-Russian cooperation was brought on by internal changes in the nation. Russia has demonstrated rising levels of corruption and a decline in the country's efforts to uphold the rule of law. Former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov explained that the worsening of ties with the EU was the cause, which led to adjustments in Russia's domestic and foreign policies. Economic cooperation with the European Union is now more difficult due to changes in the management of the Russian economy. The way the Russian capitalism evolved made it incompatible with the single market and the market economies of the EU member states. The high degree of corruption was emphasized as a distinct problem.

Relations between the EU member states and Russia grew tense despite their close economic ties and shared energy dependence. In 2010, the EU was considering partnering with a nation that did not uphold the rule of law or democracy. Without common values, "strategic partnership" was just a fancy term with no real meaning.

The inclusion of Russia in the economic system was the primary failure of all Western politicians from 1991 to 2022. They refused to acknowledge that since 2000, Russia has been engaging in an entirely different game that is firmly rooted in its domestic political structure. Due to their reliance on Russia, European nations chose to ignore the shift in that nation's policy. By using soft power and forging connections, Russia, an aggressor nation, quickly gained a significant position in the European economy after Europe decided to integrate it into its economic system. This was particularly evident in the fact that several European nations were dependent on this state for their energy needs. Europe opened relations with Russia because natural resources from that country were affordable and simple to access. As a result, they considered the needs of their own nation. These errors made by the West allowed Russia to expand its influence and gain a foothold in the European market. In the end, this had a string of horrifying repercussions that culminated in Russia's terrible attack on Ukraine on February 24. The most crucial lesson for Western strategy is that Russia's geopolitical predicament won't go away with Putin's departure. Russia's current imperial territory, where numerous peoples and regions are forcibly united, will remain in place for as long as this occurs.

The two countries' bilateral relations deteriorated after Russia started using military force against Europe (after 2015). Especially after the annexation of Crimea and the Donbass War, which were both followed by a complaint from the European Parliament. An unfavorable perception of Russia has developed in the European Union's member states as a result of Russia's deliberate political choices in recent years, particularly the illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and subsequent actions in Ukraine.¹⁷ As a result of Russia's failure to uphold the Minsk agreements, the EU has enacted punitive measures, including sectoral sanctions, and suspended formats like routine high-level dialogue and cooperation. Other issues include Russia's behavior in the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood, persistent bad deeds committed against member states, the use of chemical weapons, deceitful propaganda campaigns, hybrid attacks, and cyberattacks. Because of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022,¹⁸ relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation are deteriorating. Individual EU nations ultimately made the decision to apply pressure to Russia because, following its victory in the Ukraine, Europe's influence and values would become less significant to the rest of the world. The European Union understood that in this circumstance it was important to consider common interests and they made subsequent decisions in accordance.

¹⁷ <https://www.resdal.org/Archivo/nair-cap1.htm>

¹⁸ <https://www.cer.eu/hot-topics/russia-european-security>

Building of new security architecture in Europe during Ukraine crisis

Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Latvia are five EU members that Russia borders. Members of the European Union encircle the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad.¹⁹ Russia's largest trading partner is the European Union, and it is crucial to the development of the European energy market. Russia's oil exports are primarily what support Europe.²⁰ This is the main justification for why a number of European nations work to keep things civil with the nation. Following Russia's invasion of the Ukraine on February 24 of this year, Europe's security was confronted with a new issue that resulted in energy crises. Since then, the European Union's foreign, security, and defence policies have undergone some significant changes that are already being observed.²¹

The European Union, NATO, and their member states were required to respond forcefully and cooperatively to the Ukrainian crisis.²² The European Union and its allies in North America took unprecedented steps to exert pressure on the Kremlin and hasten the end of the war. A sixth set of sanctions, which included a ban on the import of Russian oil and the exclusion of three Russian banks from the SWIFT global payment system, was approved by EU member states in June of this year. In addition, they gave Moldova and Ukraine EU candidate status, which was unthinkable a few months ago.²³

Additionally, the European Union first turned on the European Peace Fund (EPF).²⁴ It is a recently created non-budgetary fund that has replaced, consolidated, and broadened the scope of both the African Peace Fund and the Athens Mechanism. The bloc has already promised to give Ukraine's military \$1.15 billion through the EPF, and another \$500 million will be provided on May 24.²⁵ New initiatives promoting defence innovation have also been announced by the European Commission. The European Union's top officials decided in Versailles to use the funds allotted for the defence industry in a more effective and focused way.

The raging conflict has however reignited the discussion about defence spending among member states, including "The Big Three" - Germany, France, and Italy - as well as non-NATO nations like Finland, Sweden, and even Ireland, which have a long history of neutrality.²⁶ The EU's member states have reevaluated their relationship with Russia in light of the recent events in Ukraine, and they have done so with a unified front in denouncing Russia's actions through their responses.

Politically and economically, Germany and Russia were closely linked. Therefore, the actions of Russia were viewed with particular disappointment. Even though Germany had relatively close ties to Russia, it continued to support the European Union's unified stance on sanctions against that country because the German government saw Russia's aggressive actions as a direct threat to European security. Finally, there was a mounting sense of frustration in Germany over Russia's failure to respond to its invitations for dialogue and the fact that Germany was still ready to impose more stringent sanctions in the event that the Minsk Protocol did not make any headway.²⁷ We should emphasize that until the Ukraine crisis, there were bilateral negotiations between these two nations, and that crisis was the catalyst for a significant decline in those negotiations. Germany committed to arming Ukraine. Olaf Scholz, the chancellor, promised to establish a unique, \$100 billion fund for military acquisition.²⁸

Regarding Italy, the aforementioned crisis sparked fierce debates about the nation's future course of action. The main factor was that the nation was still struggling with the health crisis and the severe socioeconomic effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. Italian support for Ukraine, in contrast to German support, included the delivery of heavy weapons like M2 Browning heavy machine guns and Stinger missiles.²⁹

France has not debated the issue much, unlike Germany and Italy, regarding increased defence funding. This reality was most likely influenced by President Emmanuel Macron's victory in his bid for reelection. The Ukrainian military received anti-tank missiles, Mistral anti-aircraft missiles, and Caesar self-propelled howitzers from the French armed forces.³⁰

Noteworthy is the fact that Finland and Sweden, two neutral nations, shocked the entire world with their deeds. By declaring that they would give Ukraine weapons, they broke their own rules. Sweden has given Ukraine

19 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia%E2%80%93European_Union_relations

20 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eeas-eu-russia_relation-en_2021-07.pdf

21 <https://www.cer.eu/insights/four-questions-how-russian-assault-ukraine-will-affect-europe>

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10,000 anti-tank weapons and other pieces of military gear, such as helmets, armor, rifles, etc., since the start of the conflict. Finland also announced at the beginning of May that it would provide Ukraine with weapons.

Finland and Sweden both formally reversed their long-standing neutral foreign and security policies and submitted formal applications to join NATO on May 18 despite threats from Russian President Vladimir Putin. Now that all of the allies have approved their requests, both Nordic countries can join NATO as full members.³¹ At the NATO summit in Madrid, the accession protocol was signed by all 30 members, and this needs to be emphasized. But the two Scandinavian nations' ratification procedures are still ongoing; they should be finished in a year. Germany has already ratified Finland and Sweden's membership, unlike Italy and France.

Even Ireland, a neutral island that is neither geographically nor commercially close to Russia, is increasing its still-modest military spending (which is presently 0.3%). Ireland, unlike Finland and Sweden, does not provide Ukraine with military aid, and it has no immediate plans to join NATO. However, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine is altering national discourse and compelling Ireland to review its security and defence strategy. A bill that would have demanded a referendum to enshrine neutrality in the Irish constitution was shot down in March by the coalition government's three constituent parties, Fine Gael, Fianna Fáil, and the Green Party.³²

CONCLUSION

We believe that the war in Ukraine represents an important opportunity for Europe to strengthen its security and eliminate gaps in its defence structure.³³ The crisis in Ukraine has created a new security architecture in which the EU and NATO seek to strengthen and support each other. They must also continue to work together to uphold common values and principles to ensure they gain both prestige and spheres of influence in the world. The real challenge for the EU is to maintain this momentum, to maintain the current level of consultation and cooperation with NATO³⁴. There is a danger that this progress and pace will soon slow down when the crisis is over, when they do not face real threats and put their own needs above common security.

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THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND EUROPE'S ENERGY SECURITY

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Abstract

Wars and crisis often push international actors to revise their approaches and policies. It increases not only security risks but also requires the new tactics and strategic decisions to overcome challenges. The ongoing war in Ukraine became a dilemma for Europe in terms of energy security. Now, with winter approaching, Brussels has to decide what the policy regarding the Russian Federation will be like. Should they increase pressure on the Kremlin with sanctions or be more cooperative towards Moscow? In case of sharper policy, what alternatives does the EU have and is it possible to reduce the dependency on Russian energy resources?

Keywords:

Europe, energy, war, Ukraine, Russia.

Introduction

Modern world's international arena encompasses the countries that are divided by their name, power, political regimes or economic prosperity. For example, those that are able to protect their sovereignty and population on their own, while having an influence on the rest of the world too, are considered as superpowers and main actors of international relations. But what allows them to hold such an essential place in the world, or what gives them power over other countries that have less potential? Independence and capability of a country is mostly dependent on its resources, be it natural or man-made. Each state's power is mainly built upon the resources that are in their possession and they use for manufacturing and economic development. Therefore, it is a common sense that the more resources a country has, the more independent it is. In a state of anarchy, where there is no guarantee of stability and security, it opens up opportunities for stronger countries to act according to their national interests first and think about other actors later. In some cases, these opportunities can be used to exert dominance over others. In today's world, energy resources are considered to be the most crucial because of their rarity and significance for not only specific economic or political, but also everyday use. For this reason, states that possess the most of natural energy resources and are self-sufficient can be seen as privileged simply because they can use their assets as lever to gain power and influence other countries that are in need of the mentioned resources. In this context, the relationship between Europe and Russia has been quite conspicuous as Moscow has been Europe's favorable energy supplier for a long time. Russia's cheaper and convenient energy resources have become a tool for Russia to have an impact on Europe and their decision-making, restraining them from acting freely, according to their beliefs. This situation and being dependent on Russia for energy, of course, is an ordeal for the west. Despite the Kremlin being the most favorable way for Europe to get necessary energy resources, after the country's multiple acts of aggression and unrealistic ambitions since 2008, Europe has started to look for alternative ways with which European countries can replace Russian oil and gas and firmly state their position against the oppressive country. Russia's latest unjust invasion in Ukraine became a wake-up call for Europe to take extreme measures. Brussels was faced with a dilemma on how sharp their policy against Russia should be in terms of sanctions as well, especially, with winter approaching and the need for natural energy resources increasing. This is a very challenging situation for Europe, with sanctions being the only way to weaken the aggressor, while its budget mainly consists of finances coming from oil and gas export, but on the other hand facing a serious shortage of necessary resources. So, how ready is Europe to find an optimal solution to seek alternative ways to get oil and gas and turn its back on Russia's energy resources?

Main part

Energy crisis that Europe is currently facing has become quite a serious issue and a popular topic of discussion all over the world. Because of that reason, new documents or articles about the matter are emerging daily and it is a challenging task to make sense of all the given, massive information. In order to provide all the useful data around the issue mentioned in this essay, it was convenient to conduct a literature review, more specifically a systematic review that aims to synthesize and gather all the evidence covering this topic, analyze the findings of the given documents and in the end draw a conclusion based on the analysis about where Europe stands in the moment and what might be their next step (Siddaway, Wood, and Hedges 2019, 750).¹

Before we go on to discuss today's situation, it is important to look at how, when and why Europe became dependent on Russia's energy resources. Answers to these questions will give us an outlook about why Europe had to be so limited in actions against Russia and what made them realize that dependence on an aggressor state would eventually result in an upheaval for the west.

Simply put, getting oil and gas from Russia was the most favorable, but more importantly, the cheapest way for Europe, because transportation by land road was easy and it was always accessible. Other than Russia having the world's largest reserves of natural gas, one of the many things about Russian gas that was attractive to Europe was that the deliveries of these resources were always stable and steady, even during war times, like Cold war (Bloomberg 2022).² The significance of Russian resources enhanced during the late nineties when production of natural gas in Europe was decreased due to their most important gas fields being shut down, such as Groningen gas fields in the Netherlands. Other than that, the need for natural gas came from the EU's decision to rapidly lessen the use of coal in order to cut emissions and achieve carbon neutrality. According to the Directorate-General for Energy for the EU, coal power generation has been decreased by about a third. Lastly, the EU has significantly reduced investments in nuclear energy to avoid any kind of possible nuclear catastrophes. For that reason, lately only 13% of energy has been

1 Siddaway, Andy P., Wood, Alex M., Hedges, Larry V. 2019. "How to Do a Systematic Review: A Best Practice Guide for Conducting and Reporting Narrative Reviews, Meta-Analyses, and Meta-Syntheses." Volume 70, (January 2019): 747-770, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010418-102803>.

2 Bloomberg News, "How Europe Became So Dependent on Putin for Its Gas," The Washington Post, July 27, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/how-europe-became-so-dependent-on-putin-for-its-gas/2022/07/26/f8a95d16-0d07-11ed-88e8-c58dc3dbaee2_story.html.

provided by nuclear power (Clifford 2022).³

It is essential to discuss the matter of the alternative ways Europe could apply to diversify gas supplies. Those ways mainly implied the countries from the Middle East, the Arab world and Caspian region. Even though Iran has great resources and is rich with gas and oil it could not play an alternative role as an energy supplier for Europe for a simple reason. After the Islamic revolution, the country was crumbling and it ended up being under international sanctions and still continues with disagreements around the nuclear program of Tehran. Other than that, transportation of gas and oil from Iran to Europe would also be a headache for the EU due to the lack of necessary infrastructure and means of safe transportation. Not only Iran but the Middle East and the Arab world would not be suitable due to the political instability (Chyong, Slavkova and Tcherneva 2015).⁴

All in all, Europe was left mostly dependent on natural gas and for the reasons mentioned above about Russia being the most beneficial supplier, having the cheapest and largest reserves of gas that would be available and easily shipped most of the times, Europe ended up being reliant on Russia. More specifically, before the invasion in Ukraine, almost a third of all gas that was provided for Europe came from the Russian state company Gazprom (Bloomberg 2022).⁵

So, when was the breaking point for Europe? When did it become clear that the region was over dependent on an aggressor country and that the essential resources have gradually become a tool for Russia to have influence on policy of the EU and their decision-making? When was the time to think about starting diversification of energy supplies?

Over the years, cooperation between Russia and the west seemed to be working for both sides being more or less satisfied with each other. Europe was getting natural gas and had a reliable supplier, Russia on the other hand was getting richer and using the wealth for its own interests. It is critical to note that Europe and the US did their best to help the Kremlin regain its strength after the Cold War and they even managed to sign agreements about not using force or waging war against another states. Moreover, in 1994 Russia signed a memorandum that aimed to ensure Ukraine's sovereignty. However, history has shown that no good ever came from trusting Russia and its motives. Soon enough, Europe was faced with facts they were trying really hard to ignore - Russia was not and never has been interested in being just another, peaceful actor on an international arena and a loser side of the Cold War. Russia's intentions were shown again 15 years ago, in 2007, at one of the most crucial security conferences of the world, at the Security Conference in Munich, where Vladimir Putin stood before the leaders of the world and clearly stated that he was not interested in keeping post-Cold War, unipolar order in the world with the US being the only master. Putin declared that for him there was no value to the liberal, free world and that he would put all the effort into regaining his power and becoming the master himself. In other words, Putin stated that he would try to rebuild the "great" Soviet Union (Fried and Volker 2022).⁶

To that end, even in 2007 it was safe to assume that Vladimir Putin never had intentions of being an ally to the west. This statement was shocking to everyone at the conference as the leaders of the west still believed or rather wanted to believe that Putin was willing to cooperate and be at peace with the fact that after the Cold War the glory and the power of Russia would not be the same. Considering the fact that Russia was quite clear about his ambitions, it should not have been a surprise for Europe when in the same year Putin started violating terms of Vienna convention and in 2008 he launched an attack on Georgia, emphasizing once again that he was not going to give up his spheres of influence, but rather fight against the westernization of the territories that are under his "wing" (Fried and Volker 2022).⁷

Even though Europe was concerned and outraged by Russo-Georgian war in 2008, unfortunately, it was expressed only in the emotions and words of encouragement and not any extreme measure was taken against Russia to stop its unjust war and killing of innocent people. During the August war, Europe was not ready yet, but also may not have seen the necessity of taking extreme measures against Russia as the aggressor would cut off all the supplies that Europe desperately needed. On a positive note, this was the moment when Europe started thinking about the alternative ways with which they could reduce their dependence on Russian oil and gas, and hence, get the ability to make political decisions regarding Russia more freely. This situation hadn't changed much in 2014, when the Russian Federation annexed the Crimea. Even though cutting back on Russia's gas and diversifying energy supplies were already in the works, Russian resources were still providing the most of the supplies for Europe (Birnbaum and

3 Catherine Clifford, "Why Europe is so dependent on Russia for natural gas," CNBC, February 24, 2022, <https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/24/why-europe-depends-on-russia-for-natural-gas.html>.

4 Chi Kong Chyong, Louisa Slavkova and Vessela Tcherneva, "Europe's alternatives to Russian gas," European Council on Foreign Relations, April 9, 2015, https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europes_alternatives_to_russian_gas311666/.

5 Bloomberg, "How Europe Became So Dependent on Putin for Its Gas."

6 Daniel Fried and Kurt Volker, "The Speech In Which Putin Told Us Who He Was", Politico, February 18, 2022, <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/02/18/putin-speech-wake-up-call-post-cold-war-order-liberal-2007-00009918>.

7 Fried and Volker, "The Speech In Which Putin Told Us Who He Was."

Mufson 2022).⁸

After 2014 it was clear that Russia was an unreliable partner to Europe. It was obvious that Vladimir Putin's policy was against all the liberal values that Europe was built upon. These events finally made Europe realize that while the price of Russia's gas was cheap and economically favorable, it was twice as destructive for their politics and security. It was also clear that natural gas has become a weapon in Russia's hands, threatening Europe's well-being every day.

Ukraine war that started in February, 2022, was the final straw for Europe and no matter how inconvenient it would be for their economies, they still decided to impose sanctions against the Russian Federation. Even Germany, one of the most reliant countries on Russian supplies, started to back out and change its policy to become self-sufficient energy-wise. Not very long ago, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stopped the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project, which President Biden later put sanctions on. It is highly likely that this project will not be renewed in the nearest future as Russia does not seem to be planning to stop the war anytime soon (Birnbaum and Mufson 2022).⁹ Meanwhile, Putin has been trying to make it more difficult for Europe to access its natural energy resources. He has significantly raised prices, which is his way of terrorizing Europe for the removal of sanctions. After imposed sanctions, Putin has changed its policy and signed a decree which, starting from April, will require all the buyers from "unfriendly" countries to pay for gas in Rubles. This means that the costumers would have to open a new, special account in Russia's Gazprombank JSC. A few of the buyers in European countries like the Netherlands, Poland, Denmark have refused to accept these new rules, which is why Kremlin cut off their gas (Bloomberg 2022).¹⁰ Moreover, quite recently the Nord Stream 1 pipeline has been disrupted, which, as Europe suspects was an attack from Russia. Even though Kremlin claims they had nothing to do with the explosion, Putin stated that they will not be trying to return supplies to the extent they were before, if Europe doesn't lift sanctions. Of course, this leads us to believe that the disruption of the pipeline was definitely not an accident (Read 2022).¹¹

So, the war in Ukraine has shown that Europe is still quite fragile in terms of energy resources. However, if during early 2000s Europe couldn't risk going against Russia, today they are putting all the effort into replacing Russia's gas and becoming self-sufficient. Now, more than ever, the West realizes that Russia needs to be stopped at all costs. War against Georgia and annexation of the Crimea might have been considered as warnings, especially, when Europe couldn't or didn't want to imagine that Putin would go as far as to wage an actual war against humanity. With this war not only Ukraine's sovereignty but the security of the European Union is at stake, which is why the West has decided that now it is the right time to put an end to the terror of Russia.

Let's look at the alternatives that Europe can use to overcome the shortage of energy resources. Even though the replacement of Russian gas will be expensive and Europe will face multiple difficulties along the way, the EU has already decreased the usage of Russian energy supplies from 45% to 14% in September. Further plan is to increase the import of liquefied natural gas (LNG). The EU has already achieved an agreement with the US that the country will provide Europe with additional, at least, 15 billion cubic meters of LNG this year. They have also signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Azerbaijan on a strategic partnership in the field of energy. One of the most important parts of the EU's strategic plan is reducing demand on gas and decreasing consumption. As of today, gas consumption has already been reduced by 15% (European Commission 2022).¹² Renewable energy is also one of the most convenient options for Europe to gain independence in energy field. "Renewables give us the freedom to choose an energy source that is clean, cheap, reliable and ours", says Frans Timmermans, Vice President of the European Commission. For instance, Germany is already shifting its attention to the growth of solar energy that will lessen the country's dependence on Russian gas (Campbell 2022).¹³

Other than that, alternatives to diversify energy sources include finding other routes for import and creating regional hubs. More specifically, Europe could import gas from the Middle East or North Africa. In particular, Iran has the potential to be Europe's supplier because of its rich resources; however, as it was mentioned before, there are a few challenges that make it less likely to form any kind of partnership with Iran, at least for now, when its cooperation with the Kremlin in Ukraine is confirmed. Other than international sanctions still being imposed on the

8 Michael Birnbaum and Steven Mufson, "E.U. will unveil a strategy to break free from Russian gas, after decades of dependence," The Washington Post, February 24, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2022/02/23/russia-ukraine-eu-nordstream-strategy-energy/>

9 Birnbaum and Mufson, "E.U. will unveil a strategy to break free from Russian gas, after decades of dependence."

10 Bloomberg, "How Europe Became So Dependent on Putin for Its Gas."

11 Simon Read, "EU countries are encouraging voluntary gas cuts - here's why and what to expect next," World Economic Forum, September 14, 2022, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/09/gas-energy-eu-rationing-russia?fbclid=IwAR3vz--xSM9BU2WQdJCLkpiOTciDluUjq0HHxPSzeCrrITNrTgVdLtsRpaU>.

12 European Commission, "EU action to address the energy crisis," An official website of the European Union, n.d., https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/eu-action-address-energy-crisis_en.

13 Maeve Campbell, "What are Europe's energy alternatives now that Russian gas is off the cards?", euronews.green, April 27, 2022, <https://www.euronews.com/green/2022/04/27/europe-scrambles-to-keep-the-lights-on-as-it-sidelines-russian-gas>.

country, there are geographical difficulties as well, such as the distribution of the resources that have to be imported (Chyong, Slavkova and Tcherneva 2015).¹⁴

One of the most realistic alternatives for Europe to get energy resources is considered to be Caspian region, which would also be strategically vital for South Caucasian countries. If Europe decides to open the corridor to South Caucasia and get gas through Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, or Turkmenistan, this region will acquire special importance. This would be beneficial for Georgia especially, because in case they decide to use the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipelines as a replacement for Russian gas, Georgia will become one of the most essential strategic points for the west (Chyong, Slavkova and Tcherneva 2015).¹⁵ This kind of significance would very likely become a security guarantee for Georgia too, as Europe would protect its important strategic allies in any way they can and in case the best scenario that would mean Georgia's membership, or at least candidacy of the European Union. The weaker the Russian influence on the neighborhood is, the more realistic it will be to start exporting energy resources from Central Asia to the EU through South Caucasia.

Conclusion

To sum up, it is clear that Europe is facing a serious energy crisis during the war in Ukraine. The reason why Europe has had their hands tied against Russia's acts of aggression was its cheap and easily accessible gas that Europe has been mostly reliant on. Even though Brussels was not ready to strictly respond to Russia's destructive actions before due to the fear of losing its main source of energy supplies, now the situation has changed. Europe has started looking for alternatives to replace Russian gas which has already resulted in its firm position against the Russian Federation. By joining the sanctions imposed against Vladimir Putin's aggressor country, Europe risked the shortage of energy resources and a really cold winter. So, other than imposing sanctions will Europe continue helping Ukraine with weapons and humanitarian resources? Or will it give in to Putin's threats and risk dependence on an unreliable, antagonist country in exchange for cheap gas? Europe's decision is and will further be expressed in its actions. Drastically reducing gas consumption and an increased import of LNGs make it clear that Europe has already made the decision to fully support Ukraine, no matter how much its economy crumbles. These sanctions might be what finally brings Putin's governance to an end, because Russia's economy is mostly dependent on its export of natural gas and oil. Without the income of its natural resources, Russia does not have much to rely on. And finally, Europe's transformation of energy supplies could easily be the beginning of a slightly new political order, important doors could be opened and small countries, such as Georgia, could end up being one of the most crucial allies for the West. Using South Caucasia would certainly be beneficial for both sides: Azerbaijan is well suited to replace Russian gas, and as a result, the region of South Caucasia could come forward as an important strategic object for the West.

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